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Chapter 1
Introduction
In view of the ongoing integration of the world economy, factor movements of
both capital and labor have increased substantially. While capital mobility
has been broadly discussed in the past, migration has only recently become
an issue ranked high on the political agenda. Among the various dimensions
of migration that include welfare-induced and illegal migration as well as
asylum seekers and refugees, one aspect of migration is of special relevance
for local tax policies: labor mobility. The observable increase in the mobil-
ity of workers confronts local governments with a mobile tax base that can
easily evade unfavorable tax systems since it acts on a labor market that by
far exceeds national boundaries. The scope of these factor markets might
entail the entire world economy in case of highly-specialized labor, several
independent national states such as the members of the European Union,
or regions within a single federal country. In all of these circumstances, the
increased mobility of labor raises the issue of whether and to what extent
local governments lose the ability to tax their workforce.
So far, labor mobility has received relatively little attention in the economic
1
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literature on optimal fiscal policy compared to the vast body of research deal-
ing with mobile capital.1 One reason for this imbalance is the widespread
conjecture of labor being relatively - if not totally - immobile. Yet, to ac-
knowledge the actual relevance of migration, one has to relate the data on
migration flows to the problem at hand: While international labor mobility
might be limited in general, migration across relatively homogenous regions
such as jurisdictions of a federation like the United States or across member
states of the European Union is presumably much higher. To motivate the fo-
cus on labor mobility in the present thesis, the following Section 1.1 provides
a brief assessment of the empirical relevance of migration for decentralized
policy making.
While the magnitude of migration is empirically disputed, modeling labor
mobility is also highly relevant from a theoretical perspective. This is due
to the fact that labor and capital do not simply represent alternative pro-
duction factors with identical characteristics. Rather, labor displays some
crucially different features possibly altering the results of theoretical models
with capital mobility: While capital flows directly affect a region’s tax base,
movements of labor impact the tax base not only directly, but also indirectly
as the owner of the capital stock changes her place of residence. The sending
country might thereby entirely lose it’s scope to levy taxes on these assets.
Moreover, a comprehensive analysis of the impact of factor mobility on fiscal
policy has to take into account the dynamic dimension of factor movements:
While most recent work discusses the implications of mobility of a given
stock of capital or labor, these stocks have been accumulated over time.
This implies that in a dynamic framework, fiscal policy does not only affect
1 See Wildasin (2006).
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the allocation of a factor in space, but additionally the incentives to accu-
mulate the factor endowment over time. The present research contributes
to the literature by considering two different dynamic setups, each capable
of analyzing both the spatial allocation as well as the evolution of stocks
over time. To introduce the problem, Section 1.2 provides an overview on
dynamic studies of fiscal competition incorporating the evolution of mobile
factors over time, a topic which has only been recognized recently in the
literature, and briefly outlines the structure of this thesis.
1.1 On the Relevance of Labor Mobility
To start the empirical assessment of the relevance of labor mobility, consider
movements of labor between independent national states that are rather het-
erogeneous with respect to migration barriers such as language, culture or
administrative systems. Figure (1.1) depicts the inflows of foreign nationals
as a percentage of the total population for selected OECD countries in 2004.
With an average of only 0.46%, mobility rates for movers from abroad are
rather low and, hence, seem to support the popular conjecture of migration
being of minor importance for policy making. Yet, this data has to be viewed
with caution as international migration is still heavily restricted. Observed
mobility rates thus most likely underestimate the potential for migration, as
they mainly reflect rigid policy barriers that prohibit free factor movements.
While mobility at the international level is rather low, this result does not
necessarily carry over to internal migration rates between regions of a single
federal state such as the United States, Canada or Germany. As jurisdictions
of federations are typically rather homogenous with respect to major obsta-
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Figure 1.1: Inflows of foreign nationals as a percentage of the total popula-
tion, selected OECD countries, 2004
Source: OECD (2006), Chart I.1.
cles of migration, one would expect to observe high levels of interregional
mobility. This view is confirmed by data on internal geographical mobility
rates for the United States, covering the period 2001 to 2005. Table (1.1)
reports the annual number of national migrants in relation to the aggregate
population of the U.S., distinguishing between movements within the same
county and to a different county within the same state or to a different state.
While an average of 13.6 percent of the total U.S. population changed their
residence in the relevant years, more than one third of these moved to an-
other county. Interestingly, mobility rates for movements across counties
within the same state and across states are nearly identical, supporting the
conjecture that barriers to migration between federal regions are relatively
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low.
Total Same state
Different
state
2004-2005 13,2 7,9 5,3 2,7 2,6
2003-2004 13,3 7,9 5,3 2,8 2,6
2002-2003 13,7 8,3 5,4 2,7 2,7
2001-2002 14,2 8,5 5,7 2,9 2,8
Mobility
period
Different residence in the United States
Total Same county
Different county
Table 1.1: Annual U.S. mobility rates by type of movement, 2001-2005
Source: U.S. Census Bureau,
http://www.census.gov/population/socdemo/migration/tab-a-1.pdf.
While the data on the United States displays a high internal mobility of
workers, data on mobility rates at the international level seem to indicate
that labor is significantly less mobile across national states, including the
member states of the European Union. Still, it is reasonable to expect an
increase in migration flows in the years to come, at least with respect to inter-
nal migration in highly integrated regions such as the European Union where
several political initiatives aim at increasing mobility. These include e.g. the
ongoing Bologna process that aims at enhancing mobility by improving the
recognition of academic degrees and qualifications, and the proposal for the
advancement of the portability of supplementary pension rights. Moreover,
comparing mobility rates of the working age population across different geo-
graphical units in the European Union in 2005 suggests that there is a high
potential for promoting migration: According to the European European
Comission (2006), mobility rates between European regions surpassed an-
nual mobility rates between EU member states on average by a factor of ten
to thirteen, contingent on the regional classification system used.
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Furthermore, it becomes obvious that migration displays an important phe-
nomenon for policy making if one compares the population growth that is
due to immigration with the natural rate of increase. Figure (1.2) decom-
poses the total population growth of the fifteen EU member states of 1995
into the rate of natural increase and the net migration rate.2 It can easily be
revealed that immigration as a component of total population growth in the
EU has outranged natural population growth since the late 1980’s.
Total population growth Net migration rateNatural increase rate
1960 1965 1970 1975 1980 1985 1990 1995 2000
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Figure 1.2: Components of total population growth in the fifteen EU member
states of 1995, 1960 - 2002, measured per 1000 inhabitants at beginning of
the year
Source: OECD (2004), Figure I.8
Moreover, as many obstacles to migration such as language and informa-
tional barriers are less relevant for highly qualified labor, a further increase
in labor mobility is likely in view of the large and rising fraction of well
2 The data covers the period 1960-2002. However, Portugal has been excluded from 2001
on and Greece from 2000 on.
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educated workers.3 This view of an enhanced mobility of skilled workers is
supported by data on the share of highly qualified labor among immigrants.
Figure (1.3) depicts the fraction of immigrants in the fifteen EU member
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Figure 1.3: Proportion of tertiary among immigrants, 1990 and 2000
Source: Author’s depiction based on Docquier and Marfouk (2006), Table
5.5.B.
states of 1995 with tertiary education for the years 1990 and 2000 and re-
veals a pronounced rise in the share of qualified immigrants for nearly all
members states. Composing the average over all displayed EU countries, the
proportion of working-age immigrants with at least tertiary education rose
by 6.4 percentage points, nearly three times of the increase in the share of
the world labor force with tertiary education of 2.2 percentage points only.4
3 Between 1990 and 2000, the share of the OECD labor force with tertiary education has
increased from 21.9 to 27.6 percent (Docquier and Marfouk, 2006).
4 These calculations are based on data provided by Docquier and Marfouk (2006).
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Still, given the data presented one might assess the mobility of labor as
relatively low. However, one has to bear in mind that the data displayed
is based on actual factor movements. Besides the obvious underestimation
due to illegal migration, the threat of mobility can hardly be evaluated on
the grounds of observed migration rates: The relatively low mobility of la-
bor might represent an equilibrium phenomenon that reflects the fact that
currently incentives to change the place of residence are low or even absent
(Andersson and Konrad, 2006). Yet, changing economic environments e.g.
as a result of a shift in fiscal policy, might result in large factor movements if
the potential for migration is high. Hence, even though observed migration
seems to be of negligible size and the true threat of migration is hard to as-
sess, labor mobility is most likely an important policy constraint that should
be kept in mind when designing optimal policies, at least at the regional
level.
1.2 Towards a Dynamic Perspective
Based on the increasing importance of international factor movements for
fiscal policies, a vast body of economic research has dealt with this phe-
nomenon. With respect to local public finance, the literature can be traced
back to two separate strands of argumentation: According to Tiebout (1956),
fiscal competition among independent jurisdictions can be viewed as welfare
improving since local public good provision can be tailored to better match
the preferences of mobile residents than centralization. More precisely, com-
munity developers, aiming at maximizing the value of land, attract mobile
labor by providing a certain mix of public goods and local head taxes. Since
a single small region cannot alter the utility level mobile households’ re-
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ceive outside of the respective community, competition of land developers
results in marginal-cost pricing: Local taxes can be interpreted as user fees
for public good provision, and households efficiently sort themselves into the
community that best serves the preferred public good level.
Quite differently, Wilson (1986) and Zodrow and Mieszkowski (1986) perceive
tax competition for mobile capital as inefficient as it results in underprovision
of public goods. Restricting the available local tax instruments to a source
tax on mobile capital, provision of local public goods that benefits immobile
households necessarily leads to capital outflows. At the same time, this
induces an increase in tax revenue for neighboring regions where the tax
base rises. Since this positive externality is disregarded by a single regions,
local jurisdictions set both the tax rate as well as the public good at an
inefficiently low level.
Later contributions to these opposing strands of literature recognize both a
welfare enhancing effect of capital tax competition as well as possible inef-
ficiencies in Tiebout-type models. A detailed survey over the various argu-
ments and approaches can be found in Oates (1999), Wilson (1999) as well
as Wilson and Wildasin (2004). Most of this research still resorts to static
analyses; dynamic aspects and implications of fiscal competition are often ig-
nored. Yet, while analyzing implications of tax competition for a fixed stock
of physical or human capital points at important issues, it neglects the im-
pact on incentives to accumulate the relevant factor over time: Fiscal policy
does not only affect the geographical allocation of factors, but additionally
determines the evolution of the factor endowment in time.
The literature on time-inconsistent fiscal policies has first recognized the rel-
evance of accumulation of mobile factors over time: While standard tax com-
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petition models emphasize the arising inefficiencies, this literature detects
welfare improving aspects of competition. Kehoe (1989) uses a two-period
model with two countries in which households decide on the amount of sav-
ings before tax rates have been set. Since the government cannot commit to
it’s announced fiscal policy, savings will be inefficiently low in anticipation of
excessive future taxation in the home country. Introducing the possibility of
capital flight, Kehoe (1989) shows that competition for mobile capital serves
as a commitment device for low source-based capital income taxes. Anders-
son and Konrad (2003a,b) as well as Thum and Uebelmesser (2003) build on
this result focusing on different aspects of education policy in setups where
mobile human capital is excessively taxed once accumulated. Bucovetsky
and Smart (2006) study the efficiency of revenue equalization schemes when
capital is elastically supplied. Introducing a hold-up problem of excessive
capital taxation at the federal level, they confirm the view that delegating
the power to tax capital to regional governments competing for the mobile
factor can solve the commitment problem and improve welfare.
In contrast, assuming that commitment is feasible, several studies have ana-
lyzed the role of savings for capital taxation in the presence of mobile capital,
but failed to detect an additional effect due to introducing a savings deci-
sion.5 Although deviating from the purely static setup, these contributions
reproduce the finding of static models that source taxes on mobile capital are
inefficient. This can be explained by the fact that these studies consider small
open economies: Since the net rate of return on capital investments is fixed
by the world rate of return, the time dimension does not alter savings incen-
tives nor the standard tax competition results - at least not as long as perfect
mobility of capital is assumed. Similarly, the inefficiency of source taxes on
5 The first study in this respect was Gordon (1986).
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mobile capital has been replicated in infinitely-lived agent frameworks. As a
consequence, contributions on optimal taxation in dynamic general equilib-
rium models mostly focus on the optimality of international tax principles
from a global perspective, while aspects of fiscal federalism and public good
provision are ignored.6
The importance of imperfect mobility as a result of adjustment costs has
first been recognized by Wildasin and Wilson (1996) for the case of mobile
labor. While initially perfectly mobile, old individuals develop some sort of
attachment to their country of residency implying that moving at a later
stage becomes costly. The resulting imperfect mobility involves economic
rents that land-value maximizing governments will try to capture, thereby
inducing inefficient migration of rationale young individuals.
However, the initial mobility might provide a mechanism to overcome the
underlying commitment problem: Wilson (1996) considers a dynamic frame-
work in which firms are initially perfectly mobile, but relocation becomes
costly once a firm has entered a specific region. Anticipating the incentives
of local residents to capture the rent income resulting from imperfect firm
mobility, firms will only enter the region if they are compensated for the loss
of economic rents, e.g. via initial subsidies financed by future tax revenue.7
Similarly, Lee (1997) shows in a two-period model that initial tax compe-
tition is especially fierce if firms face relocation costs in the second period.
At the same time, however, imperfect second period mobility reduces tax
competition and leads to an overprovision of public goods.
6 For an overview see Atkeson et al. (1999) and Chari and Kehoe (1999).
7 Similarly, Janeba (2000) utilizes a setup in which firms have incentives to invest in
excess capacities at home as well as abroad to escape high taxation once investments
are sunk: Since the firm can serve the market producing abroad, a local government
starts to compete for utilization of domestic capacity by lowering it’s tax rate.
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The study by Wildasin (2003) emphasizes that imperfect mobility resulting
from some sort of adjustment costs increases the scope of taxation of mobile
factors to redistribute income.8 Recognizing that the adjustment of factors
in space is time-consuming, a dynamic model is set up that is capable of
analyzing adjustments in the stock of capital over a long time horizon. It is
shown that while adjustment costs can increase tax rates in the short run,
this is only a transitory effect: Converging to the new steady state, the level
of capital will adjust gradually to the change in fiscal policy. This implies
that imperfect mobility affects the speed of adjustment, but not the long-run
equilibrium level of capital employed.
In addition to the research stressing time-consuming adjustments of factors
in space, the importance of incentives to accumulate mobile factors in time
has been exploited recently in a new strand of literature concentrating on
the link between growth and decentralization. While these studies typically
consider growth maximizing rather than efficiency enhancing public policies,
they utilize important insights of the tax competition literature.9 Brueckner
(2006) develops an endogenous growth model with overlapping generations
in which young and old individuals live in separate regions and differ with
respect to their preferred level of public good provision. Starting from a
centralized system with uniform provision, decentralization can better match
the different demands of consumers. Naturally, with an increasing income
over the life cycle, tastes for public good provision of the young are lower,
8 A brief description of the model and it’s implications can already be found in Wildasin
(2000a).
9 Lejour and Verbon (1997) develop an endogenous growth model focusing on welfare
rather than growth effects of tax competition. While an increase in local taxes induces a
positive tax-base externality due to capital outflow, it also generates a negative growth
externality: Since higher tax rates depress incentives to save and invest, outbound
investments decline, lowering the growth rate abroad. This implies that tax competition
results in inefficiently high tax rates and overprovision of public goods.
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implying a lower head tax under decentralization where public good provision
can be tailored to meet demands. The reverse applies for the group of old
individuals.
Given this framework, Brueckner (2006) argues that lower (higher) head
taxes for young (old) consumers change the time path of the available net
income, raising it when young, while reducing it when old. This change in the
net income path might not only increase savings but also affect the time spend
on schooling, implying that the impact on growth is ambiguous. Yet, one
can show that the regime change ultimately promotes growth.10 Similarly,
decentralization might enhance growth via increased savings incentives if
tax competition is a means to restrain excessive taxation of rent-seeking
politicians.11 Yet, Rauscher (2005, 2007) demonstrates in different variants
of endogenous growth models with Leviathan governments that the growth
effects of increased competition are ambiguous.
The present thesis contributes to this literature on dynamic aspects of fiscal
federalism, considering two distinct frameworks capable of analyzing fiscal
policies that affect both the interregional allocation as well as the evolution
of mobile factors over time. The model developed in Chapter 2 builds on
previous dynamic general equilibrium setups with perfectly mobile capital,
but additionally allows for migration of households. Using this framework
it is shown that introducing labor mobility affects optimal fiscal policies.
More precisely, migration alters the international tax regime a small open
economy chooses. As will be demonstrated below, the residence principle
10 A stimulating effect on savings as a result of better preference matching as well as a
positive impact on growth during the transition to the new steady state has already
been derived by Brueckner (1999) in an exogenous growth model.
11 The idea that fiscal competition in federalist systems can serve to restrain Leviathan
governments is due to Brennan and Buchanan (1980).
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of taxation is efficient in the absence of migration. When allowing for mo-
bile labor, however, source-based taxation of capital income turns out to be
optimal. This is due to the fact that migration responds to differences in
consumption growth. Since the source principle guarantees that after-tax
rates of return and, consequently, savings decisions are independent of the
place of residence, it ensures the convergence of consumption growth rates.
The residence principle, in contrast, is inefficient as after-tax rates of return
typically differ across regions, leading to tax-induced migration flows.
Chapter 3 considers a different aspect of the evolution of factors in time:
Parental investments in human capital accumulation of their children im-
prove the educational success, thereby affecting the composition of the fu-
ture workforce. The model developed incorporates this social mobility across
skill-types as an additional, dynamic dimension of labor mobility. Contrary
to previous studies that conjecture a reduced incentive of small regions to
invest in education if high-skilled workers are perfectly mobile, it is shown
that local jurisdictions continue to subsidize education efficiently once social
mobility is introduced. Since the amount of immobile low-skilled labor is still
determined by previous local investment in human capital, regional govern-
ments are forced to take inefficiencies in the educational process into account
and correct private underinvestment, irrespective of assumptions concerning
the mobility of high-skilled workers. The present research, therefore, reveals
that modeling the evolution of mobile factors in time provides novel insights
with respect to optimal fiscal policies in the presence of factor mobility. Con-
sequently, the last chapter concludes suggesting that more is to be gained
from exploring the dynamic aspects of fiscal competition further.
Chapter 2
Optimal Capital Taxation
2.1 Motivation
Dating back to the seminal article of Chamley (1986), standard models of
optimal capital income taxation in dynamic general equilibrium settings con-
clude that capital income should not be taxed in the steady state. Extensions
to open economy setups with source- and residence-based taxation of interna-
tionally mobile capital arrive at a similar conclusion: While residence-based
taxes on capital continue to be inefficient only in the long-run, source taxes
on capital vanish in the presence of a perfectly elastic supply of capital on
the world capital market - a standard result of the literature on local public
finance in static models1. Therefore, this literature seems to indicate that
adding a dynamic perspective by incorporating the accumulation of mobile
factors in time does not provide further insights on the optimal taxation of
I would like to thank Ferdinand Fichtner, Wolfram Richter, Efraim Sadka, and Sabine
Bo¨ckem for helpful comments and suggestions on earlier versions of this chapter.
1 See e.g. Gordon (1986).
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capital in open economies.
Nevertheless, important features are missing from these approaches. Firstly,
models dealing with open economies regularly focus solely on the case of in-
ternationally mobile capital, while labor is assumed to be immobile. Though
labor is clearly not perfectly mobile, the introductory chapter revealed that
migration nevertheless is empirically significant and, consequently, of rele-
vance for policy-making. Furthermore, labor mobility displays certain fea-
tures that differ substantially from characteristics of mobile capital suggest-
ing that results derived in the presence of capital mobility do not carry over
to the case of migration: Since workers embody human capital and, more-
over, take the assets they own with them when moving, migration flows are
particularly important for fiscal policies, as they substantially influence the
labor and, additionally, the capital tax base of an economy.
Secondly, a standard assumption of approaches to optimal taxation is that
tax revenues are used to finance an exogenously given stream of govern-
ment consumption. The analysis is, therefore, restricted to solving the so
called Ramsey problem of financing public expenditures using distorting tax
instruments. Public investment that is optimally chosen and increases do-
mestic production or the utility of households is often neglected. Though the
Ramsey problem is a good starting point to isolate the effects of distortive
taxation from issues of public good provision, Turnovsky (1996) stresses the
importance of examining the revenue and expenditure side jointly: A com-
prehensive analysis of fiscal policy cannot restrict itself to analyzing the in-
fluence of tax rates on private agents decisions. Rather, it has to take into
account that private agents react to the way revenue is spend. Thus, the
revenue and expenditure side are interconnected and should be considered
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in a single approach.2 This is of special relevance in the presence of factor
mobility since many publicly provided goods like infrastructure are subject
to congestion. Hence, the chosen fiscal policy influences location decisions
of mobile factors that in turn determine the productivity of the public good
provided.
The present chapter extends standard approaches to optimal taxation in dy-
namic general equilibrium models by introducing labor mobility in addition
to capital mobility. Deviating from the Ramsey problem, it incorporates
productive public spending and emphasizes the relevance of rivalry in deter-
mining optimal fiscal policies.
2 Based on this argument, Turnovsky (1996) develops an endogenous growth model with
public good provision and studies how the degree of rivalry affects optimal tax rates.
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2.2 Related Literature
This work is closely related to the literature on optimal taxation in dynamic
general equilibrium models that was originated by Chamley (1986) and Judd
(1985) and combines the theory of optimal taxation with exogenous growth
models. Chamley analyzes an infinitely-lived agent framework in which a
benevolent government chooses a specific fiscal policy in order to finance an
exogenously given amount of public consumption. Since lump-sum taxation
is excluded, the analysis aims at finding the fiscal policy that minimizes
distortions and yields the second-best.3 Chamley derives the result that in
the long-run capital income taxes should optimally be zero.4 This is due to
the fact that any tax on savings is equivalent to an increasing tax on future
consumption. Since consumption is constant along the balanced growth path,
compensated demand elasticities of consumption at different points in time
are identical once the steady state has been reached. Hence, according to the
uniform taxation principle, present and future consumption should be taxed
at a uniform rate implying that capital income taxes should be zero in the
long-run.
Building on the work of Chamley (1986) and Judd (1985), the result of zero
capital income taxes in the steady state has been extended in several di-
rections.5 Most relevant for the present study are extensions focusing on
optimal taxation of capital income in open economies. Typically, these stud-
ies reproduce the zero tax result for small open economies facing perfectly
3 This approach is due to Ramsey (1927) who first considered the optimal fiscal policy to
finance a given amount of government spending relying on distortive tax instruments
only.
4 Judd (1985) derived the zero tax result in a heterogenous agent framework.
5 Atkeson et al. (1999) and Chari and Kehoe (1999) provide an overview over several
extensions of the Chamley result.
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mobile capital. The intuition for zero capital taxes here is twofold. Firstly,
the argumentation of the closed economy remains to be valid: With constant
consumption levels in the steady state, compensated demand elasticities of
consumption over time are identical. According to the uniform taxation prin-
ciple, a residence-based capital income tax that taxes consumption at various
dates differently is inefficient. Secondly, introducing international mobility
of capital provides an additional argument in favor of zero capital income
taxes that is independent of the steady state: Since the supply of capital is
perfectly elastic, any source-based tax on the returns to capital is inefficient
as it induces capital flight and, thereby, shifts the tax burden to the immobile
factor labor.6
Since extending dynamic general equilibrium models to open economies does
not impact the results on the optimal taxation of capital income, this litera-
ture proceeded discussing the optimal international tax regime: While Milesi-
Ferretti and Roubini (1994) assume residence-based taxation and Correia
(1996a) compares the residence and the source principle, Razin and Sadka
(1995) introduce an explicit governmental choice between principles of inter-
national taxation showing that the residence principle is welfare maximizing.
Razin and Yuen (1999) extend these approaches and establish the optimality
of the residence principle in a multi-country model of endogenous population
growth.
Although optimal taxation in open economies supports the Chamley-Judd re-
sult, several studies question it’s robustness. For example, Erosa and Gervais
(2001, 2002) and Garriga (2000) show that zero capital income taxes can only
be replicated in overlapping generations models assuming the availability of
6 This is a standard result of static open economy models with perfectly mobile capital
(see e.g. Gordon (1986)).
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age specific taxation. Other examples include the presence of imperfect com-
petition (Judd, 1997), borrowing constraints that prevent insurance against
idiosyncratic shocks (Aiyagari, 1995; Chamley, 2001), and time-inconsistent
fiscal policies (Benhabib and Rustichini, 1997). Studies introducing labor
market imperfections lead to ambiguous results. While Koskela and von
Thadden (2003) derive a positive long-run tax on capital income under wage
bargaining, Palokangas (2005) uses a slightly different setup to reproduce the
zero tax result.
Moreover, allowing for public good provision provides a justification for pos-
itive capital income taxes. Corsetti and Roubini (1996) and Dome´nech and
Garc´ıa (2002) consider a productive public input that is rival, but non-
excludable and prove that the long-run capital income tax need not be zero:
If congestion costs are induced by the factor capital, a capital income tax
is efficient to establish the first-best allocation. In contrast, if capital does
not impose any social costs, there is no reason for taxing this income source.
Deriving a similar result, Jones et al. (1993) consider the case of productive
government expenditure that enhances the effectiveness of investment. Yet,
as Correia (1996b) notes, this is an example of a model in which not all
factors can be taxed sufficiently. Introducing an untaxable factor like public
investment imposes additional restrictions on the set of available tax instru-
ments. In such a setting the Corlett-Hague rule applies according to which
it is optimal to tax complementary factors like capital at higher rates.
The present chapter extends previous approaches to optimal capital income
taxation in dynamic general equilibrium models with respect to two basic
features: Firstly, in contrast to standard models of optimal taxation, labor
as well as capital mobility is allowed for. Secondly, the expenditure side is
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explicitly taken into account. More precisely, productive public spending
is incorporated, allowing for varying degrees of congestion induced by the
internationally mobile factor labor.
The analysis reveals that introducing migration changes the optimal struc-
ture of international taxation: While a small open economy aims at estab-
lishing production efficiency by applying the residence principle of taxation
in the absence of migration, consumption efficiency is welfare maximizing if
labor mobility is allowed for. This implies that the source principle of taxa-
tion is efficient in the presence of migration. The optimality of source-based
taxation can be explained by the fact that, in a dynamic framework, mi-
gration flows react to differences in consumption growth. Since the source
principle ensures the convergence of consumption growth rates across coun-
tries, it avoids tax-driven migration flows and is, consequently, efficient in a
setup where labor is internationally mobile.
The subsequent analysis proceeds in two steps: First, an open economy model
with mobile capital and productive public spending is developed to reproduce
the standard zero capital income tax result. In a second step, the model is
extended to allow for perfect mobility of households and derive the optimal
fiscal policy in the presence of mobile capital and labor. The last section
summarizes the main results.
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2.3 The Model
Suppose the world economy consists of many countries i = 1, ..., m, each
deciding independently on local tax policy and public good provision. Every
country behaves as a small open economy, taking foreign rates of return on
capital and labor as well as fiscal policies as given. Initially, the countries
are populated by a given number of identical households and have access
to the same production technology. Any differences between countries are
either due to differences in the size of the initial population, the tax policies
adopted or the amount of the local public good provided.
At time t = 0 and prior to private agent decision making, the government
of a particular country i decides on the path of tax rates and public good
provision, anticipating the households’ and firms’ reaction to the announced
sequence of fiscal policy. To rule out the issue of time inconsistency, it is
assumed that the government has access to a commitment technology to
guarantee that the chosen policy is indeed binding and will not be revised in
future periods. Without such a commitment mechanism,7 the government
has an incentive to deviate from the optimal fiscal policy after private agents
have made their decision, as this amounts to efficient lump-sum taxation.8
Although factor mobility can in principle reintroduce the elasticity of the
tax base forcing governments to stick to the announced path of policy,9 the
incentive to revise the fiscal policy persists in an open economy model with
residence-based taxation as long as the labor force remains immobile.
7 While access to a commitment technology might be unrealistic, binding fiscal policies
could alternatively be enforced via reputational mechanisms (Chari and Kehoe, 1999).
8 The problem of time-inconsistent policies has been pointed out by Kydland and
Prescott (1977).
9 Using a dynamic framework, Kehoe (1989) shows that competition among governments
for mobile capital can serve as a commitment device for low tax rates.
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To isolate the effects of migration on the optimal fiscal policy in the following
analysis, two versions of the model are considered: a small open economy
framework with perfectly mobile capital is used to reproduce the standard
results of the literature in a setup with productive public good provision.
Further insights into the optimal taxation of capital income and the role of
congestion costs for optimal fiscal policies will be derived in an extension of
this model that additionally allows for labor mobility.
2.3.1 Production
Firms in a particular country i produce a single aggregate good Y it , that can
be transformed at no cost into consumption cit, asset holdings a
i
t, government
debt bit, and public spending G
i
t.
10 The aggregate production function con-
sists of a private production function F it (·) and a social production function
Φit(·),
Y it = F (K
i
t ,N
i
t ) · Φ(G
i
t) =
(
Kit
)α (
N it
)1−α
·
(
Git
)γ
, (2.1)
with 0 < α+ γ < 1 and γ ≥ 0. Kit denotes the capital input and N
i
t = h
i
tN
i
t
the labor input, consisting of human capital provided, hit, times the size of
the labor force, N it . Since investment of asset holdings can be spread across
countries, locally employed capital comprises investments by residents, aiit N
i
t ,
and capital inflows from abroad, A• it =
∑
j 6=iA
ji
t with A
ji
t = a
ji
t N
j
t .
11 Notice
that the distinction between residents’ domestic capital investments, aiit , and
capital inflows from abroad, ajit , is a prerequisite for modeling a general tax
10 Throughout the analysis, upper-case letters denote aggregate variables, while lower-
case letters refer to the respective variable per capita of the current population of
the corresponding country. t is the time index and i indicates the country under
consideration.
11 The superscript ji indicates the flow of capital from country j to country i.
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system comprising all variants of crediting.12
It is assumed that the government provides a local public input Git that is
rival but non-excludable and enters production via the function Git . The
productivity of the public good is subject to congestion induced by either
the capital input (
∂Git
∂Kit
< 0), or the aggregate labor supply (
∂Git
∂N it
< 0), or
both.
Although the public good is subject to a congestion externality, it is im-
portant to note that a single firm perceives the effective public input Git as
exogenously given. This is due to the fact that the total factor supply, and
accordingly the induced congestion costs, cannot be influenced by decisions
of an individual firm. Rather, from the point of view of a single firm, the per
capita production function is given by
yit = f(k
i
t, h
i
t)Φ
i
t(G
i
t) =
(
kit
)α (
hit
)1−α (
Git
)γ
. (2.2)
With perfect competition among firms and profit maximization, production
factors are paid their marginal products as perceived by private firms,
rit = f
i
kΦ(G
i
t) = α
yit
kit
(2.3)
wit = f
i
hΦ(G
i
t) = (1− α)
yit
hit
, (2.4)
where rit denotes the rate of return on capital and w
i
t the wage rate.
Notice that in the present setup any market allocation will be inefficient as
firms do not take into account the congestion costs arising at the aggregate
level. The resulting wedge between the private and the social marginal rate of
12 The available tax instruments will be discussed in detail below.
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return can be eliminated using a Pigouvian tax on factor income. According
to Turnovsky (1996),13 the optimal income tax rate depends on the degree
of congestion induced by the respective production factor,14 implying that
the optimal tax policy is contingent on the assumption as to which factor of
production congests the public input to what extent.
The relevance of public-spending-related externalities for the optimal long-
run capital income tax has also been studied by Corsetti and Roubini (1996)
in a closed economy setup with physical as well as human capital accumula-
tion. They consider the polar cases of rivalry induced by just one of the two
production factors in a two-sector endogenous growth model. The optimal
taxation analysis reveals that a long-run tax on capital income is only opti-
mal if capital congests the public good. If the other production factor human
capital exerts the external effect, the capital income tax will be zero. Their
framework has been extended by Dome´nech and Garc´ıa (2002) who allow for
simultaneous congestion by both production factors and reproduce the basic
result of Corsetti and Roubini (1996): The optimal fiscal policy involves a
positive capital income tax whenever the factor capital induces at least part
of the congestion costs.
Since the present study focuses on the effects of migration on optimal long-
run capital income taxation, positive capital income taxes that are driven
by underlying assumptions on rivalry should be avoided. Therefore, the
following analysis is restricted to the case of congestion induced by the ag-
13 Turnovsky (1996) uses a dynamic model of a closed economy in which capital is the
only production factor to study the impact of congestion on optimal policies for public
consumption as well as production goods.
14 In contrast, Glomm and Ravikumar (1994) show that the income tax rate is indepen-
dent of the degree of rivalry. Yet, in their model the set of available tax instruments is
restricted to uniform income taxes on capital and labor. Since both factors congest the
public input to varying degrees, a uniform income tax rate can never fully internalize
the externality, entailing that their analysis refers to a second-best problem.
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gregate labor supply.15 According to Corsetti and Roubini (1996) as well as
Dome´nech and Garc´ıa (2002) such a setup should yield the optimality of a
wage tax while the tax on capital income should be zero.
In the following, it is assumed that the productive public good Git is subject
to congestion induced by the production factor labor, that is
∂Φit(·)
∂N it
≤ 0. To
allow for various degrees of congestion, the function Git is defined as
Git =
Git
(N it )
η =
Git
(hitN
i
t )
η . (2.5)
The congestion parameter η with 0 ≤ η ≤ 1 indicates the degree of rivalry of
the public good and comprises the extreme cases of a pure public good (η = 0)
and a publicly provided private good (η = 1). In case of γ = 0, government
spending is purely consumptive and has no impact on production.
The aggregate social production function per capita can now be written as
yit = f(k
i
t, h
i
t)Φ
i
t(G
i
t) =
(
kit
)α (
hit
)1−α−ηγ ( Git
(N it )
η
)γ
. (2.6)
Notice that although the production factor labor reduces the productivity
of the public input on the aggregate level, this negative externality is disre-
garded by a single firm. Consequently, the marginal product of labor exceeds
the social rate of return,
wit = f
i
h · Φ
i
t(·) = (1− α)
yit
hit
> (1− α− ηγ)
yit
hit
= f ih · Φ
i
t(·) + f
i
t (·) Φ
i
h. (2.7)
Expression (2.7) reveals that the wedge between the private and the social
rate of return depends on the congestion costs ηγyit. In contrast, Corsetti and
15 Still, the present framework can easily be extended to allow for a more general speci-
fication of rivalry.
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Roubini (1996) as well as Dome´nech and Garc´ıa (2002) argue that the wedge
is induced by pure profits generated by the public good and appropriated
by one of the production factors. Their intuition is derived from modeling a
publicly provided private good (η = 1). Consequently, in their framework the
congestion costs are equivalent to the pure profits of public good provision
that might arise theoretically, γyit. Still, as they assume linear homogeneity
of private production, pure rents do not arise. Rather, as becomes apparent
when introducing varying degrees of rivalry, the wedge between the private
and social rate of return relates to the congestion externality.16
2.3.2 Government
The government of a single region i is benevolent in the sense that it maxi-
mizes the discounted lifetime utility of a representative resident. It has access
to a set of distortive income taxes that it uses to finance public spending. To
balance the budget, the government can issue one-period debt bit domestically.
Since in representative agent models equilibrium borrowing and lending only
occurs between households and the government, one can assume without any
loss of generality that bonds are tax-exempt. The return on bonds is denoted
by ribt.
The tax instruments available to generate revenue comprise taxes on wage
income (τ iwt) as well as taxes on residents’ capital income from domestic
source (τ irDt) and foreign source (τ
i
rF t). Furthermore, returns on inbound
investments, that is non-residents’ domestic source capital income, are taxed
16 If public good provision generates factor rents that accrue to capital, positive source-
based taxation of capital income is justified since this amounts to a fully efficient user
charge for public good provision. As Kellermann (2006) points out, user fees on capital
exceed the revenue requirements to finance the public input in the steady state, thereby
entailing the possibility of redistributing income.
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at the rate τ irIt. Hence, double taxation of foreign source capital income
can arise whenever both the residence and the source country levy taxes on
capital returns. In order to alleviate the arising double taxation of foreign
source income, the government can credit capital income taxes already paid
in the foreign country at the rate δit. The effective tax residents of country
i pay on foreign source capital income is τ irEt = τ
i
rF t + (1 − δ
i
t)τ
j
rIt. This
approach is capable of integrating the credit system, the exemption system,
as well as the deduction system into a single framework.17
Under the crediting system, foreign source capital income is subject to do-
mestic taxation. However, part of the taxes paid to the source country are
credited against domestic tax liabilities. With full crediting (δit = 1), double
taxation is eliminated and the effective tax rate equals the domestic tax on
capital income, τ irEt = τ
i
rF t. With a crediting rate of δ
i
t = 0, full double
taxation persists and the effective tax rate on foreign source income becomes
τ irEt = τ
i
rF t+τ
j
rIt. Since countries typically limit refunding to tax liabilities at
home, the tax revenue collected from foreign capital income is non-negative
(τ irF t − δ
i
tτ
j
rIt ≥ 0). Therefore, the maximum credit rate equals δ
i
t =
τ i
rF t
τ
j
rIt
. In
this case, the effective tax rate on foreign source income reduces to τ irEt = τ
j
rIt,
and the exemption system is realized under which foreign capital income is
not subject to domestic taxation.
If the government applies the deduction method, domestic taxes are levied
on the net return of foreign investment after source taxes have been sub-
tracted from the tax base. Therefore, the effective rate of return to capital
investments abroad becomes (1 − τ irEt)r
j
t = (1 − τ
i
rF t)(1 − τ
j
rIt)r
j
t . Put dif-
17 While previous research by Frenkel et al. (1991) as well as Razin and Sadka (1995)
consider effective tax rates, Razin and Yuen (1999) explicitly integrate the crediting
rate into the analysis.
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ferently, the effective tax rate comprises the source taxes paid abroad and
the domestic capital taxes paid on the net returns of foreign investment,
τ irEt = τ
j
rIt+ τ
i
rF t(1− τ
j
rIt). Rewriting the effective tax rate under the deduc-
tion system to τ irEt = τ
i
rF t + (1− τ
i
rF t)τ
j
rIt reveals that the deduction system
is a special case of crediting with δit = τ
i
rF t.
Table 2.1 summarizes the different ways to alleviate double taxation, dis-
playing the corresponding crediting rate as well as the effective tax rate.
Credit rate (0 ≤ δit ≤
τ i
rF t
τ
j
rIt
) Effective tax rate
Crediting 0 < δit < τ
i
rF t/τ
j
rIt τ
i
rEt = τ
i
rF t + (1− δ
i
t)τ
j
rIt
– no crediting: δit = 0 τ
i
rEt = τ
i
rF t + τ
j
rIt
– unlimited ∼: δit = 1 for τ
i
rF t ≥ τ
j
rIt τ
i
rEt = τ
i
rF t
Exemption δitτ
j
rIt = τ
i
rF t for τ
i
rF t ≤ τ
j
rIt τ
i
rEt = τ
j
rIt
Deduction δit = τ
i
rF t τ
i
rEt = τ
i
rF t + (1− τ
i
rF t)τ
j
rIt
Table 2.1: Methods to tax foreign source income
The different methods of taxation can be used to model different international
tax regimes like the pure residence principle, the pure source principle, or
any combination of the two. If τ irDt = τ
i
rF t and τ
i
rIt = 0 in all countries,
pure residence-based capital income taxation is implemented, entailing that
all residents’ capital income is taxed at a uniform rate. As a result, the
effective tax rate on foreign source capital income equals τ irEt = τ
i
rF t, and the
pre-tax rates of return to capital are equalized across countries. This implies
that investment decisions are based on marginal productivities, leading to
an efficient allocation of investment across countries (production efficiency).
At the same time, however, the saving decision will be distorted when the
CHAPTER 2. OPTIMAL CAPITAL TAXATION 30
after-tax rates of return to capital and, thus, the prices of future consumption
vary across countries. Therefore, consumers’ intertemporal marginal rates of
substitution differ, and the allocation of savings is inefficient (consumption
inefficiency).
If τ irDt = τ
i
rIt and τ
i
rF t = δ
i = 0 or τ irF t = δ
iτ jrIt in all countries, a pure source-
based capital income tax system is realized. This entails that, from the point
of view of investors residing in different countries, after-tax rates of return of a
particular investment are leveled out. Consequently, the allocation of savings
is efficient (consumption efficiency), while the allocation of investment is
distorted (production inefficiency). In this case, the effective tax rate on
foreign source capital income reduces to τ irEt = τ
j
rIt.
Given the tax system discussed above, the period t budget constraint in per
capita terms can be written as
git = b
i
t+1 − (1 + r
i
bt)b
i
t + T
i
t , (2.8)
where T it captures the tax revenue generated using labor and capital income
taxes,
T it = τ
i
wtw
i
th
i
t + τ
i
rDtr
i
ta
ii
t +
∑
j 6=i
(
τ irF t − δ
i
tτ
j
rIt
)
rjta
ij
t + τ
i
rItr
i
t
A• it
N it
. (2.9)
Note that, since initial asset holdings, bonds and human capital are inelas-
tically supplied, the government can tax these endowments without any effi-
ciency loss. To avoid the exclusive use of such lump-sum taxation and keep
the problem interesting, all tax rates in period t = 0 are exogenously fixed.18
18 Obviously, lump-sum taxation can only be eliminated assuming vanishing tax rates.
Still, it suffices to restrict the tax rates by introducing some upper bound preventing
that the entire budget is financed using non-distorting tax instruments.
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Furthermore, consumption taxes are not allowed for.
2.3.3 Household Behavior
Households maximize their discounted lifetime utility resulting from con-
sumption,
∞∑
t=0
βtu(cit), (2.10)
where 0 < β < 1 is a discount factor and cit denotes current consumption
in period t. The utility function is assumed to be strictly concave with
uict > 0, u
i
cct < 0 and fulfills the Inada conditions, limc→0 u
i
ct = ∞ and
limc→∞ u
i
ct = 0. An isoelastic utility function satisfies the above conditions
and is commonly used in the literature,
u(cit) =
(cit)
1−σ
− 1
1− σ
, (2.11)
where σ is the inverse of the intertemporal elasticity of substitution in con-
sumption.
Households can smooth consumption over time by accumulating physical
capital ait, holding government bonds b
i
t, and investing in human capital
hit. The endowments with assets a
i
0, government bonds b
i
0 as well as human
capital hi0 are given and identical for all households, irrespective of the initial
country of residence.
While government bonds are issued domestically and human capital can only
be employed in the residence country, physical capital investments can be
split between countries. Therefore, households earn capital income from in-
vestment at home aiit and abroad a
ij
t , with total asset holdings a
i
t = a
ii
t +
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∑
j 6=i a
ij
t . Pre-tax wage income can be summarized as w
i
th
i
t and pre-tax cap-
ital income from various sources as rita
ii
t +
∑
j 6=i r
j
ta
ij
t . The entire net income
(1− τ iwt)w
i
th
i
t + (1− τ
i
rDt)r
i
ta
ii
t +
∑
j 6=i
(1− τ irEt)r
j
ta
ij
t + r
i
btb
i
t (2.12)
is spent on current consumption cit, savings in form of assets a
i
t+1 − a
i
t or
government bonds bit+1 − b
i
t, and human capital accumulation h
i
t+1 − h
i
t.
In contrast to most previous studies on the optimal taxation of capital in-
come, human capital is modeled in a perfectly symmetric way compared to
physical capital, while working time is supplied inelastically. In a model with
consumptive government spending, Jones et al. (1993) show that this entails
identical long-run tax rates of zero for both physical as well as human capital.
Introducing a labor-leisure decision, Bull (1993) as well as Jones et al. (1997)
reproduce this result using a setup where working time is supplied jointly
with human capital. Consequently, the restrictive assumption of an inelastic
supply of working time in the present framework does not alter the results in
the basic model. Yet, it simplifies the migration dynamics in the extended
version substantially. Furthermore, since the analysis focuses on the impact
of migration on the optimal taxation of capital income, there is not much to
be gained from introducing an additional labor-leisure choice.
Given the fiscal policy of the respective country of residence, the period t
budget constraint of the household can be expressed as
cit + a
i
t+1 + h
i
t+1 + b
i
t+1 =
[
1 + (1− τ iwt)w
i
t
]
hit +
[
1 + (1− τ irDt)r
i
t
]
aiit
+
∑
j 6=i
[
1 + (1− τ irEt)r
j
t
]
aijt +
[
1 + ribt
]
bit. (2.13)
The household’s optimization problem is subject to each period’s budget con-
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straint, the initial endowments as well as the following transversality condi-
tions,
lim
t→∞
λita
i
t+1 = 0 lim
t→∞
λith
i
t+1 = 0 lim
t→∞
λitb
i
t+1 = 0 (2.14)
where λit denotes the Lagrange-multiplier associated with the period t budget
constraint.
Solving the household’s problem of choosing the allocations
{
cit, h
i
t+1, a
ii
t+1, a
ij
t+1,
bit+1
}
yields the following first-order conditions,
∂
∂cit
: βtuict = λ
i
t (2.15)
∂
∂hit+1
: λit = λ
i
t+1
(
1 + (1− τ iwt+1)w
i
t+1
)
(2.16)
∂
∂aiit+1
: λit = λ
i
t+1
(
1 + (1− τ irDt+1)r
i
t+1
)
(2.17)
∂
∂aijt+1
: λit = λ
i
t+1
(
1 + (1− τ irEt+1)r
j
t+1
)
(2.18)
∂
∂bit+1
: λit = λ
i
t+1
(
1 + ribt+1
)
. (2.19)
Combining the household’s first-order conditions immediately yields the no-
arbitrage condition that after-tax rates of return are equalized across coun-
tries at any point in time,
(1− τ irDt)r
i
t = (1− τ
i
rEt)r
j
t = (1− τ
i
wt)w
i
t = r
i
bt. (2.20)
Especially the fact that after-tax rates of return on different physical capital
investments have to be equalized will frequently be used throughout the
analysis.
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2.4 Primal Approach
To disentangle the effect of migration and congestion costs on the optimal
taxation of capital income, the analysis proceeds in two steps: Firstly, op-
timal fiscal policies in the absence of migration are deduced, discussing the
impact of rivalry on the results. To this end, the subsequent section reviews
the primal approach that is commonly used in dynamic general equilibrium
models to solve for the optimal steady-state tax rates. The technique is then
applied to the basic model, that is in the absence of migration. Secondly,
optimal tax policies in the presence of migration are derived and contrasted
with the results of the basic model. To keep the analysis in line with pre-
vious studies, the tax system is considered from a national point of view,
that is for a single, small open country i. This implies that a local welfare
maximizing government does not take into account any possible influence
on other countries. Rather, the optimal fiscal policy derived can be viewed
as the best response given foreign tax policies, interest rates and available
production factors.
Suppose the government of a country i is benevolent and intends to maximize
the discounted lifetime utility of a representative resident. To ensure that the
welfare optimum can be implemented in a decentralized way as a competitive
market equilibrium, the government has to anticipate the reaction of private
agents since the household’s optimality conditions are contingent on the path
of fiscal policy. Thus, the government maximizes a representative consumer’s
lifetime utility subject to (1) the government’s budget constraint, (2) the
household’s budget constraint, (3) the first-order conditions of the household
and the firm, and (4) the transversality conditions.
One way to integrate the household’s first-order conditions into the cen-
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tral planning problem is to construct optimal demand functions depending
on net prices and derive the indirect utility function of the representative
consumer (see Diamond and Mirrlees (1971)). According to Atkinson and
Stiglitz (1980, pp. 376), this approach is also referred to as the dual approach,
in which the government optimizes using price variables as controls. While
this method is widely used in the public finance literature on optimal taxation
in static models, an alternative method employs quantities instead of prices
as control variables. The primal approach builds on the observation that the
tax rates and Lagrange multipliers in the consumer’s first-order conditions
can be regarded as functions of the allocations (see Ramsey (1927) as well
as Atkinson and Stiglitz (1972)). Consequently, one can reduce the central
planning problem to one of choosing allocations only, while the optimal tax
rates can later be deduced using the private agents’ first-order conditions.
Lucas and Stokey (1983) extended the use of the primal approach to dynamic
models including a production sector with endogenous factor prices, and the
method now dominates fiscal policy analysis in dynamic general equilibrium
models. Following Lucas and Stokey (1983), the primal approach reduces
the central planning problem to one of maximizing social welfare subject to
two fairly simple constraints, guaranteeing that the optimum represents a
competitive equilibrium: the implementability constraint and the economy-
wide resource constraint.19
First, consider the implementability constraint that integrates all consumer’s
optimality conditions into a single expression: When deciding on the optimal
fiscal policy, the government has to obey the consumer’s budget constraint
and must anticipate the optimal reactions of the private agents with respect
19 Chari and Kehoe (1999) provide a formal proof that imposing the implementability
and the resource constraint indeed ensures that a competitive equilibrium is attained.
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to the announced fiscal policy. Except for period t = 0, where tax rates are
fixed by assumption, the households’ first-order conditions provide functional
forms of net prices which can be used to eliminate the prices and tax rates
from the household’s budget constraint as stated in equation (2.13),
cit + a
i
t+1 + h
i
t+1 + b
i
t+1 =
λit−1
λit
(
ait + h
i
t + b
i
t
)
(2.21)
⇔ βtuictc
i
t = β
t−1uict−1
(
ait + h
i
t + b
i
t
)
− βtuict
(
ait+1 + h
i
t+1 + b
i
t+1
)
. (2.22)
Summing up over all periods and applying the transversality conditions yields
the budget constraint in present value terms,
∞∑
t=0
βtuictc
i
t = βu
i
c0
[(
1 + (1− τ irD0)r
i
0
)
ai0
+
(
1 + (1− τ iw0)w
i
0
)
hi0 +
(
1 + rib0
)
bi0
]
. (2.23)
Equation (2.23) is also referred to as the implementability constraint. It
integrates all conditions necessary for the household’s utility optimization,
that is the household’s budget constraint, the first-order conditions, and
the transversality conditions. Consequently, imposing this restriction on the
planning problem guarantees that, given the fiscal policy, the optimal allo-
cation can be decentralized as a competitive equilibrium. Notice that initial
endowments as well as tax rates in period t = 0 are exogenously given.
Thus, the implementability constraint only depends on allocations while en-
dogenous prices and tax rates have been eliminated.
To ensure feasibility of the optimal allocation, one has to additionally impose
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country i’s resource constraint,
yit = c
i
t + a
i
t+1 − a
i
t + h
i
t+1 − h
i
t + g
i
t
+
(
1− τ irIt
)
rit
A• it
N it
−
∑
j 6=i
(1− τ jrIt)r
j
ta
ij
t , (2.24)
where A• it =
∑
j 6=iA
ji
t =
∑
j 6=i a
ji
t N
j
t denotes the aggregate capital inflow
from abroad. The economy-wide resource constraint states that total pro-
duction has to finance household expenditures, public spending and net cap-
ital income payments to foreigners minus net capital income received from
abroad.
The last producer price, the domestic interest rate rit, still has to be elimi-
nated from the resource constraint. To this end, use the no-arbitrage condi-
tion of a particular country j (equation (2.20)), which is exogenously given
from the point of view of a small country i, and express the interest rate
as a function of foreign taxes and allocations as well as the domestic tax on
inbound investments,
(1− τ jrDt)r
j
t = (1− τ
j
rEt)r
i
t ⇔ r
i
t =
(1− τ jrDt)
(1− τ jrEt)
rjt , (2.25)
with τ jrEt = τ
j
rF t + (1− δ
j
t )τ
i
rIt.
The benevolent government of region i maximizes the discounted lifetime
utility of a representative household,
∑∞
t=0 β
tu (cit), subject to the imple-
mentability constraint and the economy-wide resource constraint per capita
of the current population. Since the implementability constraint guarantees
a balanced budget on the side of the household, and the resource constraint
has to be fulfilled, the government’s budget is met according to Walras’ law.
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Consequently, it suffices to impose the implementability and the feasibility
constraint as restrictions on the central planning problem. Integrating part
of the implementability constraint into the objective function, one can define
a modified social welfare function20
ω
(
cit, λ¯
i
)
= u(cit) + λ¯
iuictc
i
t, (2.26)
where λ¯i denotes the Lagrange-multiplier on the implementability constraint.
The social planning problem can now be written as
max
∞∑
t=0
{
βtω
(
cit, λ¯
i
)
(2.27)
−λ¯iβuic0
[(
1 + (1− τ irD0)r
i
0
)
ai0 +
(
1 + (1− τ iw0)w
i
0
)
hi0 +
(
1 + rib0
)
bi0
]
−µit
[
cit + a
i
t+1 − a
i
t + h
i
t+1 − h
i
t −
∑
j 6=i
(1− τ jrIt)r
j
ta
ij
t − χ
i
t
] }
,
with µit being the Lagrange-multiplier on the resource constraint. The vari-
able χit comprises all terms in the economy-wide resource constraint that
depend on the population size,
χit = f
i
t (·)Φ
i
t(·)−
Git
N it
−
(
1− τ irIt
)
rit
A• it
N it
with rit =
(1− τ jrDt)
(1− τ jrEt)
rjt . (2.28)
As all prices and most of the tax rates have been eliminated from the con-
straints, the central planner has to solely choose the allocations
{
cit, h
i
t+1, a
ii
t+1,
aijt+1, A
• i
t , G
i
t
}
21 as well as the remaining tax rate τ irIt that enters the op-
20 Lucas (1990) refers to this as the pseudo-utility function, replacing the current period
utility function.
21 Since the domestic capital stock consists of domestic investments aiit as well as aggre-
gate capital imports from abroad A• it , which are subject to different tax rates, the
optimization has to explicitly distinguish between the two sources of investment.
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timization problem via the effective tax rate τ jrEt. The other tax rates
{τ irDt, τ
i
rF t, τ
i
wt} as well as the optimal credit rate {δ
i
t} can later be deduced
using the household’s and firm’s first-order conditions. The first-order con-
ditions of the social optimization problem are stated in Appendix A.1.
2.5 Optimal Fiscal Policy in the Absence of
Migration
In order to replicate the Ramsey result of zero long-run capital income taxes
in the present model specification of open economies with local public good
provision, the following section focuses on a setup with perfectly mobile cap-
ital but immobile households. In a second step, the basic framework is ex-
tended to include a migration decision of households and discuss under what
circumstances labor mobility influences the optimal taxation of capital in-
come in the long-run.
First, consider the optimality condition for the allocation of investments be-
tween the domestic economy and the rest of the world by combining equations
(A.3) and (A.4). Efficiency requires that the marginal productivity of cap-
ital invested in country i equals the after-tax rate of return to investments
abroad,
f iktΦ
i
t(·) = r
i
t = (1− τ
j
rIt)r
j
t . (2.29)
This is an application of production efficiency from the point of view of a
small country that cannot influence foreign tax policies and has no impact on
the net rate of return on outbound investments: The allocation of investments
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is efficient when the marginal productivity of capital invested at home equals
the after-tax rate of return to investments abroad.
The domestic economy can achieve this condition by applying the deduction
method22 and, moreover, imposing identical tax rates on residents’ domestic
and foreign source capital income (τ irDt = τ
i
rF t). To see this, consider the
no-arbitrage condition that investors residing in i face (equation (2.20)), and
make use of the fact that the effective tax rate under the deduction system
equals τ irEt = τ
i
rF t + (1− τ
i
rF t)τ
j
rIt (see Table 2.1),
(1− τ irDt)r
i =
(2.20)
(1− τ irEt)r
j = (1− τ irF t − (1− τ
i
rF t)τ
j
rIt)r
j (2.30)
⇔ (1− τ irDt)r
i
t = (1− τ
i
rF t)(1− τ
j
rIt)r
j (2.31)
⇔ rit = (1− τ
j
rIt)r
j if τ irDt = τ
i
rF t. (2.32)
Given the after-tax rate of return to investments abroad, a small open econ-
omy can establish production efficiency by levying identical tax rates on
residents’ domestic source capital income and the net returns to outbound
investments.
Moreover, since a benevolent small open economy aims at establishing pro-
duction efficiency, it refrains from taxing non-residents’ capital income at
source. To derive the optimal tax rate on inbound investments, rewrite the
first-order condition with respect to A• it (equation (A.5)),
f iktΦ
i
t(·) = r
i
t =
(A.5)
(
1− τ irIt
)
rit ⇔ τ
i
rIt = 0. (2.33)
22 See Homburg (1999).
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Obviously, it is optimal not to tax inbound investments at all.23 This is
due to the fact that with perfectly mobile capital the domestic net rate of
return to inbound investments has to equal the rate of return available in the
rest of the world. Put differently, foreign investors have to be compensated
for any tax increase, implying that a source-based capital income tax raises
the domestic cost of capital. As a consequence, capital imports decline and
the source tax levied is shifted to the immobile factor labor. To avoid this
welfare loss of source-based taxation of mobile capital, the optimal tax on
non-residents capital income will be zero.24
Proposition 1 To ensure an efficient allocation of investments, a small
open economy intends to achieve production efficiency. This entails that the
residence principle of taxation with τ irDt = τ
i
rF t = δ
i and τ irIt = 0 is welfare
maximizing in the absence of migration.
Since the domestic economy does not tax non-residents, it is irrelevant whether
the rest of the world applies the crediting or the deduction system. To see
this, recall that deduction can be interpreted as a special case of crediting
with the credit rate δjt = τ
j
rF t. The first-order condition with respect to the
tax rate on inbound investments (equation (A.9)) reveals that any distinction
23 Using a two-period model, Homburg (1999) refers to this standard result as the national
production efficiency theorem according to which a small open economy should not tax
capital at source.
24 Assuming symmetry, one can easily reveal that the pure residence principle of inter-
national taxation is welfare maximizing: If the rest of the world refrains from taxing
inbound investments, production efficiency (rit = r
j
t ) will be established and the no-
arbitrage condition reduces to (1 − τ irDt)r
i
t = (1 − τ
i
rFt)r
j
t . Combining these results
immediately yields the residence principle with τ irDt = τ
i
rFt and τ
i
rIt = 0. The effi-
ciency of the residence principle has been established by Razin and Sadka (1991) in
a two-period model and by Razin and Sadka (1995) in a dynamic general equilibrium
framework.
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between crediting and deduction becomes redundant,25
1− τ jrF t− (1− δ
j
t )τ
i
rIt =
Def.
1− τ jrEt =
(A.9)
(1− τ irIt)(1− δ
j
t )⇔ τ
j
rF t = δ
j
t . (2.34)
While the above results are valid for all time periods, the optimal tax rates
on residents’ income can only be derived in the long-run. This is due to
the fact that matching the household’s and the central planner’s first-order
conditions requires the private and the social intertemporal marginal rates
of substitution in consumption to be identical (
λit
λit+1
=
µit
µit+1
). This, however,
will only be the case if the intertemporal elasticity of substitution is constant
over time - a condition that is fulfilled in the steady state.
To see this, take the definition of the government’s objective function (equa-
tion (2.26)) and apply it to the central planner’s first-order condition on
consumption (equation (A.1)) to get
µit
µit+1
=
(A.1)
βtωict
βt+1ωict+1
=
βtuict
[
1 + λ¯i
(
uicctc
i
t
uict
+ 1
)]
βt+1uict+1
[
1 + λ¯i
(
uicct+1c
i
t+1
uict+1
+ 1
)] . (2.35)
Now suppose that the system converges to a steady state26 in which con-
sumption and, consequently, the reciprocal of the intertemporal elasticity of
substitution σ = −u
i
cctc
i
t
uict
are constant. Using this fact as well as the house-
hold’s first-order condition on consumption (equation (2.15)), according to
which λit = β
tuict, indicates that the private and social intertemporal marginal
25 See Razin and Yuen (1999).
26 In the following analysis, the optimal tax rates are deduced assuming that such a
steady-state exists.
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rates of substitution will be identical in the steady state,
µit
µit+1
=
βtuict
[
1 + λ¯i (1− σ)
]
βt+1uict+1
[
1 + λ¯i (1− σ)
] = βtuict
βt+1uict+1
=
(2.15)
λit
λit+1
. (2.36)
It is important to notice that the identity of the private and the social in-
tertemporal marginal rates of substitution in consumption requires that the
intertemporal elasticity of substitution is constant over time. This will be the
case once the system has converged to a steady state, or whenever specific
utility functions are assumed that display a constant elasticity of substitu-
tion.
Given the isoelastic utility function assumed above, the private and social
intertemporal marginal rates of substitution in consumption are identical for
all periods t ≥ 1. Still, the subsequent derivation of optimal tax rates refers
to the more general steady state assumption to emphasize that the results do
not hinge on the underlying utility function: In the present model setup with
perfectly mobile capital, the economy jumps to the steady state immediately.
As will be shown below, this implies that capital income taxes are zero from
period t = 2 onwards, irrespective of assumptions concerning the underlying
utility function.27 Observe, however, that in either case the equality of the
marginal rates of substitution does not extend to period t = 0 since the
central planner’s first-order condition with respect to consumption involves
an additional term (see Appendix A.1).
To derive the optimal tax on residents’ domestic source capital income, com-
bine the household’s and central planner’s first-order conditions on domestic
27 This argumentation carries over to the extended version with perfectly mobile labor:
Although the level of human capital accumulated cannot be adjusted by immigration,
the aggregate labor supply can still be balanced instantaneously by increasing the size
of the workforce.
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investments (equations (2.17) and (A.3)) and use the fact that capital is paid
according to its marginal product,
1 + (1− τ irDt)r
i
t =
(2.17)
λit−1
λit
=
(2.36)
µit−1
µit
=
(A.3)
1 + f iktΦ
i
t(·) = 1 + r
i
t (2.37)
⇔ τ irDt = 0. (2.38)
Equation (2.38) reveals that the optimal tax on residents’ domestic source
capital income is zero for all periods t ≥ 2.
The result of zero long-run taxes on residents’ domestic source capital in-
come is due to Chamley (1986).28 It can be viewed as an application of the
uniform taxation principle, according to which goods with identical compen-
sated demand elasticities should be taxed at a uniform rate (Atkinson and
Stiglitz, 1972). In the present case of inelastic labor supply and time-additive
utility,29 the compensated demand elasticity of consumption exactly equals
the inverse of the intertemporal elasticity of substitution σ that was used to
derive the zero tax result. Only when σ is constant over time, it is optimal
to tax present and future consumption at a uniform rate: Since a positive
tax on capital income amounts to taxing future consumption at a rate in-
creasing in time, although demand elasticities are constant, capital income
taxes should be zero.
Furthermore, residents’ foreign capital income is not taxed in the domestic
economy. To see this, combine the household’s and the government’s first-
order conditions with respect to outbound investments (equations (2.18) and
28 Judd (1985) derives the same result in a setup with heterogenous households showing
that capital income taxes are not efficient to redistribute income.
29 Chamley (1986) establishes a far more general result, allowing for elastic labor supply
and a broader class of utility functions.
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(A.4),
1 + (1− τ irEt)r
j
t =
(2.18)
λit−1
λit
=
(2.36)
µit−1
µit
=
(A.4)
1 + (1− τ jrIt)r
j
t (2.39)
⇔ τ irF t + (1− δ
i
t)τ
j
rIt =
Def.
τ irEt = τ
j
rIt (2.40)
⇔ τ irF t = δ
i
tτ
j
rIt (2.41)
The exemption system, leaving outbound investments effectively untaxed
in the domestic economy, is welfare maximizing. Combined with the zero-
tax result with respect to residents’ domestic source capital income, this
implies that a benevolent government does not distort it’s residents’ decision
to accumulate capital in the steady state. Again, this is an implication of the
uniform taxation principle since any residence-based tax on capital income
amounts to an increasing tax on future consumption.
Proposition 2 A welfare maximizing local government refrains from taxing
residents’ capital income in the long-run since any residence-based tax on
capital violates the uniform taxation principle.
Similarly, equating the private and social first-order conditions with respect
to human capital (equations (2.16) and (A.2)) yields
1 + (1− τ iwt)w
i
t =
(2.16)
λit−1
λit
=
(2.36)
µit−1
µit
=
(A.2)
1 + f iht(·)Φ
i
t(·) + f
i
t (·)Φ
i
ht. (2.42)
Recall that the marginal rate of return to human capital as perceived by
private firms exceeds the social rate of return. One can use this fact to
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rearrange equation (2.42) and derive the optimal tax rate on wage income,
(1− τ iwt)f
i
hΦ
i
t(·) =
(2.42)
f ihΦ
i
t(·) + f
i
t (·)Φ
i
h (2.43)
⇔ (1− τ iwt)(1− α)
yit
hit
=(1− α− ηγ)
yit
hit
(2.44)
⇔ τ iwt(1− α)
yit
hit
=ηγ
yit
hit
⇔ τ iwt =
ηγ
1− α
. (2.45)
As equation (2.45) reveals, the optimal long-run tax on wage income is con-
stant and depends on the degree of rivalry η exerted by the factor human
capital. This is plausible since the wage rate exceeds the social rate of return
to human capital by the congestion costs induced. The optimal long-run
tax on human capital reduces the private rate of return by ηγ, capturing
the additional social cost.30 Thus, the wage tax is an efficient instrument to
equate the private and social rate of return to human capital. Further than
internalizing the congestion externality, human capital should not be taxed
in the long-run. To see this observe that the optimal wage tax vanishes for
the case of a pure public good (η = 0) or government consumption (γ = 0).
This is, again, in line with the uniform taxation principle, as human and
physical capital formation are perfectly symmetric in the present setup.
Proposition 3 If the factor human capital imposes congestion costs, the
long-run tax on labor income is used to internalize the involved social costs,
equalizing the private and social rates of return. Consequently, the tax rate
depends positively on the degree of rivalry η.
Next, consider the first-order condition with respect to the public input
30 This is in line with Turnovsky (1996) who developed a closed economy model with
productive public infrastructure to show that optimal capital income tax rates depend
on the degree of congestion.
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(equation A.6) to derive the optimal provision of the public good,
1
N it
=
(A.6)
f it (·)Φ
i
Gt = γ
yit
Git
⇔ git = γy
i
t. (2.46)
As equation (2.46) reveals, the public input is optimally provided if the per
capita costs of provision equal the marginal productivity of public spending.
This, however, implies that the long-run tax system is not necessarily suffi-
cient to finance the optimal level of the public good. While residence-based
capital income taxes vanish in the long-run, the wage tax depends on the
degree of rivalry. Substituting the optimal wage tax into the government’s
budget constraint demonstrates that the revenue raised by taxing labor in-
come is only sufficient in case of a publicly provided private good (η = 1),
git = τ
i
wtw
i
th
i
t = ηγy
i
t. (2.47)
For other cases of rivalry (0 ≤ η < 1), the government has to rely on initially
high tax rates in period t = 1 to finance the entire stream of remaining
revenue requirements. If government spending is purely consumptive (γ = 0),
the whole path of expenditures has to be financed by initial income taxation,
combined with an appropriate debt policy.31
Note that in the presence of a publicly provided private good, a benevolent
government has no incentive to deviate from the optimal tax plan. This is
due to the fact, that the tax system establishes a first-best allocation. Even
if a commitment mechanism is not available, entailing that the possibility
31 The government will optimally only tax returns to investments in the first period,
thereby imitating an initial tax on endowments. If the tax rate is bounded from above,
the optimal policy comprises positive income taxes for a limited period of time, drop-
ping to zero as the system converges to the steady-state. For a more detailed description
of this second-best policy, see Lucas (1990).
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to revise the policy in succeeding periods exists, the government will stick
the optimal tax plan announced in period 0. Thus, the policy derived is
time-consistent.
As the analysis of the optimal tax system reveals, Chamley’s result of zero
long-run taxes on capital income can be reproduced in the present framework.
While residence-based taxes on capital income are zero in the long-run, taxing
labor income is optimal to internalize the congestion externality. This is due
to the fact that aggregate human capital induces an externality as it lowers
the productivity of the public good. Moreover, since a small open economy
aims at establishing production efficiency, it refrains from taxing inbound
investments. In a next step, this basic model is extended to include mobile
labor and to analyze the impact of migration on optimal capital taxation.
For ease of comparison, Table 2.2 summarizes the optimal fiscal policy in the
absence of migration.32
32 Although the table refers to the more general steady state results, the optimal income
tax rates in the present model setup are valid for all periods t ≥ 2.
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General Results
Production efficiency (A.3)=(A.4) rit = (1− τ
j
rIt)r
j
t
Public good provision (A.6) git = γy
i
t
Tax Rate on Non-Residents
Domestic source capital income (A.5) τ irItr
i
t = 0
Steady State Tax Rates on Residents
Domestic source capital income (2.17)=(A.3) τ irDtr
i
t = 0
Foreign source capital income (2.18)=(A.4) τ irF t = δ
i
tτ
j
rIt
Labor income (2.16)=(A.2) τ iwtw
i
t = ηγ
yit
hit
Table 2.2: Optimal fiscal policy in the absence of migration
2.6 Capital Income Taxation and Migration
While the basic model reproduces standard findings of the literature on op-
timal taxation in dynamic general equilibrium, this section evaluates the rel-
evance of migration for the results derived. To this end, the basic framework
is extended to incorporate perfect mobility of households across countries.
Subsequently, optimal income tax rates are deduced emphasizing the impact
of labor mobility for the optimal taxation of capital income.
2.6.1 Migration
Households are perfectly mobile across countries and migration can take place
in every period and can go in any direction. Thus, the possibility of return
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migration is explicitly allowed for. This implies, that in period t = 0 a
potential migrant not only decides on the entire consumption path when
optimizing her lifetime utility given her initial endowments. Rather, the
migrant additionally plans the path of migration, that is at which point in
time to migrate to which country. The migration decision can, therefore, be
interpreted as one of choosing between different optimal consumption paths
each being contingent on one specific migration history. In planning the
sequence of migration and the consumption path the household regards the
fiscal policies of all possible residence countries as given.
Once a sequence of migration and a corresponding consumption path have
been chosen, the household carries out these decisions in the following way:
at the beginning of each period, the household migrates to another coun-
try, e.g. changes her place of residency. It is important to recognize, that
at this point in time, the household’s acquired level of bond holdings, hu-
man as well as physical capital is predetermined. The household will take
this acquired wealth with her when migrating, implying that all decisions
on investments and consumption are carried out after migration has taken
place. As a consequence, they will resemble decisions of other residents of
the receiving country, who are confronted with the same fiscal policy.
While the path of migration is planned initially, migration really is a one-
period decision only, since the change in the place of residence might take
place in every period. One can, therefore, focus on each period’s migration
equilibrium to determine the driving factors of migration. Remember that
by migrating, a potential migrant in period t decides on where to reside
given her acquired wealth, or, similarly, as a resident of which country to
invest. This implies that the migration decision reduces to a choice between
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potentially different net rates of return across countries.
To keep the migration dynamics tractable, the analysis abstracts from any
costs of moving such as language, cultural or administrative barriers to mi-
gration. Consequently, a migration equilibrium will be characterized by a sit-
uation in which all migration incentives vanish completely. From the point
of view of a potential migrant this entails that net rates of return across
countries are identical in every period t,
1 + (1− τ iwt)w
i
t
1 + (1− τ irDt)r
i
t
1 + (1− τ irEt)r
j
t
1 + ribt

=
λit−1
λit
=
λ
j
t−1
λ
j
t
=

1 + (1− τ jwt)w
j
t
1 + (1− τ jrDt)r
j
t
1 + (1− τ jrEt)r
i
t
1 + rjbt.
(2.48)
Notice that, due to arbitrage, each investment form will earn the same net
rate of return in a particular country of residence.
Taking the reciprocal and applying the isoelastic utility function, one can
rearrange equation (2.48) to
λit+1
λit
=
λjt+1
λjt
⇔
(2.15)
uict+1
uict
=
ujct+1
ujct
⇔
cit+1
cit
=
cjt+1
cjt
⇔ ĉit = ĉ
j
t , (2.49)
where ĉt is the growth rate of per capita consumption. Equation (2.49) indi-
cates that the differences in the intertemporal marginal rates of substitution
in consumption and, thus, consumption growth determine migration: In any
migration equilibrium the growth rates of per capita consumption have to be
equalized across countries.
As has been shown by Razin and Yuen (1996), growth rate convergence will
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only occur under the source principle: Facing equal after-tax rates of return to
capital, consumers’ intertemporal marginal rates of substitution are identical,
and consumption efficiency is established. This entails that savings decisions
are independent of the place of residence. Consequently, consumption growth
rates converge, implying that the source principle is optimal in the presence
of migration. Under the residence principle, in contrast, migration flows no
longer react to productivity differences across countries but to differences in
the level of taxation.
Observe that prior to migration households can differ by their initial endow-
ments, implying that the chosen consumption paths might equally differ. As
a consequence, the population of a country i in any period t > 0 will be
heterogenous as it consists of remaining natives as well as immigrants who
have previously entered the country and stayed. To avoid this and keep the
analysis in line with the representative consumer setup that dominates the
literature on optimal taxation in dynamic general equilibrium models, it is
assumed that all households in the world economy possess the same amount
of initial wealth. This involves not only assuming identical endowments, but
also requires that initial tax rates, which have been exogenously fixed to
avoid lump sum taxation, are independent of the respective jurisdiction.
The equality of the intertemporal rates of substitution in consumption to-
gether with the equality of initial endowments entails that households choose
the same consumption path, no matter in which country they live.33 Hence,
the population of a country, that consists of natives and migrants, is homo-
geneous. It is, thus, sufficient to take into account changes in the size of the
population of a country, N it , while migration flows can be neglected. Since
33 Assuming initially identical endowments in all countries implies that, ex-post, utility
levels will be equalized in any migration equilibrium.
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the possibility of return migration is not excluded, the size of the population
can rise or decline over time.
One can utilize equation (2.48) to derive a functional form of the evolution
of the domestic population. This allows to explicitly trace back the influence
of labor mobility on the fiscal policy chosen. To separate the migration dy-
namics from the problem of optimal public good provision,34 equate country
i’s net wage rate ((1−τ iwt)w
i
t) and the foreign net rate of return on outbound
investments ((1− τ jrEt)r
i
t). Since both rates of return depend on the produc-
tion function yit = f(k
i
t, h
i
t)Φ
i
t(G
i
t), one can eliminate the public good from
the migration equilibrium,
(1− τ iwt)(1− α)
yit
hit
=
(2.48)
(1− τ jrEt)α
yit
kit
⇔ kit =
(1− τ jrEt)
(1− τ iwt)
α
(1− α)
hit, (2.50)
with kit = a
ii +
A• it
N it
. Solving for the domestic population, N it , yields
N it =
A• it
(1−τj
rEt
)
(1−τ iwt)
α
(1−α)
hit − a
ii
t
. (2.51)
Equation (2.51) defines the population in country i depending on different tax
rates, the level of human capital employed and the amount of physical capital
invested in the domestic economy. While N it rises with a
ii
t and A
• i
t , the size
of the domestic population declines with the level of human capital used in
production. This is plausible since the migration equilibrium is characterized
by the equivalence of the net rates of return across countries. Although
foreign rates of return are given from the point of view of a small open
34 Otherwise, competition for mobile labor will be carried out via taxation as well as gov-
ernment spending since the rates of return are determined jointly by taxes and public
inputs. As will be shown below, detaching the migration decision from public good
provision entails that governments optimally provide the public input, while migration
decisions are only affected by tax policies.
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economy, the marginal productivity of domestic factor inputs is determined
by the capital intensity of production: A rise in aiit or A
• i
t increases the wage
rate and reduces the rate of return on physical capital. The household can
avoid the lower rate of return on physical capital invested in i by shifting her
investments abroad - the net rate of return on domestic and foreign capital
investments is fixed by the no-arbitrage condition. Changes in the rate of
return to physical capital will, thus, not affect migration incentives. Still, a
rise in aiit or A
• i
t induces a higher wage rate. This in turn leads to immigration
and increases the domestic population size.
Obviously, while differences in the productivity of capital can be realized
without moving, this is not the case for wage differences. Therefore, labor
productivity dominates the migration decision. Whenever the physical (hu-
man) capital input is extended, the productivity of labor and, thus, the do-
mestic population increases (falls). Based on the same mechanism, changes
in fiscal policy affect the net rate of return on labor, and with it, migra-
tion incentives: A rise in the domestic wage tax lowers migration incentives,
leading to a decline in N it . In contrast, increasing the tax rate on inbound
investments (τ irIt) raises the effective tax rate on foreign capital investments
(τ jrEt). This reduces the rate of return on capital investments in country i
for residents of j and, consequently, induces capital flight and immigration.
Since both allocations as well as tax rates determine the size of the domestic
population, the migration dynamics constitute an important constraint for
any welfare maximizing government. The following section derives the opti-
mal tax policy a representative region chooses if migration of households is
allowed for.
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2.6.2 Optimal Fiscal Policy in the Presence of Migra-
tion
Just as before, consider a benevolent government that maximizes the welfare
of country i’s representative resident subject to the implementability as well
as the economy-wide resource constraint. Due to the small open economy
assumption, any influence on other countries is neglected. However, the
central planner takes into account that households are mobile by treating
the domestic population as a function of the allocations {hiit , a
ii
t , A
• i
t } and
the domestic tax rates {τ irIt, τ
i
wt}.
35 Given this additional constraint, the
primal approach to optimal taxation changes slightly: the wage tax has to
be included as a further choice variable of the government as the domestic
population not only depends on allocations but is also determined by taxes
on inbound investment and labor income. Since prices and most tax rates
have been eliminated from the optimization problem, the central planner
decides on the allocations
{
cit, h
i
t+1, a
ii
t+1, a
ij
t+1, A
• i
t , G
i
t
}
as well as the tax rates
{τ irIt, τ
i
wt}.
The planning problem can be written in the following way,
max
∞∑
t=0
{
βtω
(
cit, λ¯
i
)
(2.52)
−λ¯iβuic0
[(
1 + (1− τ irD0)r
i
0
)
ai0 +
(
1 + (1− τ iw0)w
i
0
)
hi0 +
(
1 + rib0
)
bi0
]
−µit
[
cit + a
i
t+1 − a
i
t + h
i
t+1 − h
i
t −
∑
j 6=i
(1− τ jrIt)r
j
ta
ij
t − χ
i
t
] }
.
Since the government optimizes the welfare of a representative household,
35 Alternatively, one can introduce the migration equilibrium as an additional constraint
to the governments’ optimization problem. This implies that the population is used as
a direct control variable by the government.
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the problem is stated in per capita terms. Hence, the population size solely
affects the economy-wide resource constraint via the variable χit comprising
all terms that depend on the population size N it ,
χit = f
i
t (·)Φ
i
t(·)−
Git
N it
−
(
1− τ irIt
)
rit
A• it
N it
with rit =
(1− τ jrDt)
(1− τ jrEt)
rjt . (2.53)
As a consequence, changes in one of the choice variables influencing the
population size modify the optimality conditions slightly by adding a sup-
plementary term that captures the effect of changes in the population on the
resource constraint
∂χit
∂N it
. Observe that the set of choice variables now addi-
tionally includes the domestic wage tax, entailing that optimization leads to
an additional first-order condition. The first-order conditions of the welfare
optimization problem are stated in Appendix A.2.
Following the above procedure, one can derive the welfare maximizing tax
system using the optimality conditions of the central planning problem. Con-
sider first the efficient allocation of investments between the domestic econ-
omy and the rest of the world by combining equations (A.13) and (A.14),
rit +
∂χit
∂N it
∂N it
∂aiit
= (1− τ jrIt)r
j
t . (2.54)
According to equation (2.54), an efficient allocation of investments from
the point of view of a small open economy depends on the migration re-
sponses that a change in residents’ domestic capital investments induces,
∂N it
∂aiit
,
weighted by the effect of changes in the population size on the economy-wide
resource constraint,
∂χit
∂N it
. Allowing for migration affects the optimal alloca-
tion of investments and, thereby, the structure of taxation.
To determine in what respect the structure of taxation changes, it is useful
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to derive the optimal tax rate on inbound investments first. To this end,
take the first-order condition with respect to inbound investments (equation
(A.15)) and observe that
∂N it
∂A• it
N it =
∂N it
∂aiit
,
f iktΦ
i
t(·) = r
i
t =
(A.15)
(1− τ irIt)r
i
t −
∂χit
∂N it
∂N it
∂A• it
N it (2.55)
⇔ τ irItr
i
t = −
∂χit
∂N it
∂N it
∂A• it
N it = −
∂χit
∂N it
∂N it
∂aiit
. (2.56)
Combining this result with equation (2.54) indicates that an optimal alloca-
tion of investments in the presence of migration requires identical after-tax
rates of return to in- and outbound investments,
(1− τ irIt)r
i
t = (1− τ
j
rIt)r
j
t . (2.57)
Equation (2.57) reveals that a small open economy facing perfectly mobile
labor aims at establishing consumption efficiency: the after-tax rate of return
to residents’ investments abroad ((1−τ jrIt)r
j
t ) should be equal to the net rate
of return to inbound investments ((1− τ irIt)r
i
t). This is due to the fact that
a migration equilibrium is characterized by the convergence of consumption
growth rates. As has been explained before, this requires that consumption
efficiency holds: The allocation of investments between the domestic economy
and the rest of the world will only be efficient, if migration responses to
changes in the domestic capital stock have been taken into account. Since
migration occurs as long as the after-tax rates of return between countries
differ, consumption efficiency is a prerequisite for an efficient allocation of
investments.
A small open economy can establish condition (2.57) applying the source
principle of taxation, that is imposing identical tax rates on domestic source
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income (τ irDt = τ
i
rIt) and tax-exempting residents’ foreign source income
(τ irF t = δ
iτ jrIt). To see this, consider again the no arbitrage-condition that
investors residing in i face (equation (2.20)), and apply the source principle
of taxation,
(1− τ irDt)r
i =
(2.20)
(1− τ irEt)r
j =
Def.
(1− τ irF t − (1− δ
i)τ jrIt)r
j (2.58)
⇔ (1− τ irIt)r
i
t = (1− τ
j
rIt)r
j. (2.59)
While the residence principle is optimal in the absence of migration, intro-
ducing mobility of labor changes the welfare maximizing international tax
regime: a small open economy facing mobile capital and labor aims at es-
tablishing consumption efficiency by applying the source principle of taxa-
tion. Source-based taxation of capital income guarantees that tax-induced
migration incentives vanish as mobile consumers face identical intertempo-
ral marginal rates of substitution. As a result, consumption growth rates
converge.
Proposition 4 To ensure an efficient allocation of mobile factors in the
presence of migration, a small open economy intends to achieve consumption
efficiency. Consequently, the source principle of taxation with τ irDt = τ
i
rIt and
τ irF t = δ
iτ jrIt is welfare maximizing.
To derive the remaining tax rates, remember that matching the household’s
and the central planner’s first-order conditions requires identical private and
social intertemporal marginal rates of substitution in consumption (
λit
λit+1
=
µit
µit+1
). Since this condition is fulfilled in the steady state, the derived income
tax rates represent the long-run fiscal policy. However, in case of an isoelastic
utility function, the optimal tax system is valid for all periods t ≥ 2. Table 2.3
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provides an overview over the optimal fiscal policy a benevolent government
chooses in the presence of migration.
General Results
Consumption efficiency (A.13)=(A.14) (1− τ irIt)r
i
t = (1− τ
j
rIt)r
j
t
Public good provision (A.16) git = γy
i
t
Tax Rate on Non-Residents
Domestic source capital income (A.15) τ irItr
i
t = −
∂χit
∂N it
∂N it
∂A• it
N it
Steady State Tax Rates on Residents
Domestic source capital income (2.17)=(A.13) τ irDtr
i
t = −
∂χit
∂N it
∂N it
∂aiit
Foreign source capital income (2.18)=(A.14) τ irF t = δ
i
tτ
j
rIt
Labor income (2.16)=(A.12) τ iwtw
i
t = ηγ
yit
hit
− ∂χ
i
t
∂N it
∂N it
∂hit
Table 2.3: Optimal fiscal policy in the presence of migration
Table 2.3 reveals that the efficient fiscal policy is contingent on the term
∂χit
∂N it
.
If
∂χit
∂N it
= 0, the optimal tax system reduces to the fiscal policy derived in
the absence of migration. This is plausible since any influence of changes
in the population size will naturally vanish if labor is immobile. Yet, if one
allows for migration, that is N it can vary with changes in the allocations or
tax rates,
∂χit
∂N it
need not vanish. Rather, it expresses the net social benefit
of further immigration. To see this, differentiate the economy-wide resource
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constraint with respect to the population size to get
∂χit
∂N it
= −f iktΦ
i
t(·)
A• it
(N it )
2 + f
i
t (·)Φ
i
Nt +
Git
(N it )
2 + (1− τ
i
rIt)r
i
t
A• it
(N it )
2 (2.60)
= f it (·)Φ
i
Nt +
Git
(N it )
2 − τ
i
rItr
i
t
A• it
(N it )
2 . (2.61)
Equation (2.61) indicates that the impact of a marginal change of the pop-
ulation size on the economy-wide resource constraint can be interpreted as
the net social benefit of migration: An additional immigrant imposes social
costs in terms of congestion costs (f it (·)Φ
i
Nt < 0) and reduced tax revenue
on inbound investments (τ irItr
i
t
A• it
N it
) that now has to be shared by more resi-
dents. At the same time, the migrant contributes to welfare as the per capita
costs of public good provision (
Git
N it
) decline. As long as the social benefit of
migration is greater than zero (
∂χit
∂N it
> 0), further immigration is beneficial
until the gains from cost sharing are offset by the congestion costs plus the
loss from revenue sharing.36
Obviously, the term
∂χit
∂N it
can be interpreted as the shadow price of migra-
tion according to which the optimal population size will be established if the
marginal migrant contributes as much in terms of reduced per capita pub-
lic good costs as she imposes in terms of congestion costs and reduced per
capita tax revenue on inbound investments. Consequently, the first-order
condition with respect to the wage rate (equation (A.18)) reveals that an
interior solution to the optimization problem requires
∂χit
∂N it
= 0.37 If this can
be achieved, the optimal tax system supporting the first-best coincides with
36 Since natives and migrants are homogenous, per capita variables do not affect the net
social benefit of migration.
37 Note that the optimality condition is equivalent to the one obtained by differentiating
with respect to N it in a setup in which the planner directly controls the population
size.
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the fiscal policy derived in the absence of migration (see Table 2.3): While all
capital income taxes should be zero in the long-run, labor income taxation
is an efficient instrument to internalize the social costs associated with the
degree of rivalry of the public good.
It remains to be shown under which conditions a small open economy can
achieve
∂χit
∂N it
= 0. To this end, make use of the fact that the optimal tax
on inbound investments equals zero (τ irIt = 0) once the net social benefit of
migration vanishes. Furthermore, using the specific production function to
rewrite the congestion costs reduces the net social benefit to
∂χit
∂N it
= f it (·)Φ
i
Nt +
git
N it
= 0 (2.62)
⇔ git = ηγy
i
t. (2.63)
According to equation (2.63) the optimal population size will be achieved if
the average costs of public good provision (git) equal the marginal congestion
costs (ηγyit) that are induced by further immigration. This finding resem-
bles a standard result of the literature on club theory that was originated by
Buchanan (1965).38 This strand of literature derives conditions for the opti-
mal community size in the presence of rival public consumption goods: For a
given level of public good provision, the optimal size of clubs consuming this
good will be achieved when the average costs of provision equal the marginal
congestion costs induced by the last entrant.39
Yet, in the present model setup the level of public good provision is not
given but determined endogenously by the production technology. The op-
38 A general overview on club theory can be found in Rubinfeld (1987).
39 McGuire (1974) derives the optimal club size in the presence of congestion costs in a
stylized model economy.
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timal provision of the public good entails git = γy
i
t (see Table 2.3).
40 This
implies that an interior solution for the optimal population size is only feasi-
ble in case of a publicly provided private good: average and marginal costs of
providing the public input will only be equivalent if η = 1. In this case, the
entire costs of public good provision can be raised by taxing labor income to
internalize the congestion costs. The actual size of the domestic population
is indeterminate since costs and benefits of migration always equalize. Con-
sequently, migration flows are irrelevant for fiscal policies, and the efficient
tax system is equivalent to the one deduced when labor is immobile.
Proposition 5 In case of a publicly provided private good, the net social
benefit of migration vanishes. As a consequence, the optimal tax system co-
incides with the one derived in the absence of migration.
For other cases of rivalry, it is optimal to share the remaining costs of public
good provision among an increasing number of residents, that is to extend
the domestic population to infinity.41 This is due to the fact that there
is no additional immobile factor such as land that can be taxed without
efficiency loss. Introducing such an immobile factor, an interior solution
for the optimal population size can be achieved for intermediate degrees of
rivalry (0 ≤ η < 1): Adding a fixed factor introduces a trade-off between
the positive effect of cost sharing and the negative effect of sharing the land
40 The optimality condition of public good provision is independent of any assumptions
with respect to the mobility of labor. This is reasonable since the functional form
determining the population size has been derived eliminating the rival public input:
Although immigration induces congestion costs, fiscal competition will only take place
via tax policy.
41 Observe that this affects the optimal tax rate on labor income, as can be revealed by
inspection of the first-order condition with respect to the wage tax. In this situation,
the available tax instruments are no longer sufficient, since the government cannot
regulate migration without at the same time distorting the decision to accumulate
human capital. While introducing head taxes could solve this problem, lump-sum
taxation has been excluded as it is not compatible with the present migration approach.
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rent among an increasing population. The optimal population size will be
achieved if both effects exactly balance.
Flatters et al. (1974) first considered the optimal population size from a
national point of view in a setup with fully taxable land rents. In their model
with provision of a pure public consumption good, the optimal population
size is achieved when the aggregate land rent equals the costs of public good
provision. This result is often referred to as the Henry George theorem.
Extending the Henry George Theorem to frameworks with congestion costs,
the condition for an optimal club size has to be modified: the optimal club
size is achieved if the total costs of public good provision equal the user
charges introduced to internalize the congestion costs plus the total land
rent.42
This reasoning carries over to setups with productive public good provision.
In the present framework, this would entail that the costs of providing the
public input equal the revenue from taxing labor income plus the aggregate
land rent. Note, however, that the net social benefit of migration would
be negative in case of a publicly provided private good, where average and
marginal costs of public good provision are identical. As a consequence,
the optimal population size in the presence of a fixed factor and a publicly
provided private good would be zero: any additional resident lowers the per
capita land rent available.
Summarizing, the integration of a migration decision does alter the optimal
tax policy a local government chooses. Since households respond to differ-
ences in the after-tax rates of return to capital investments when deciding
on migration, migration affects the optimal international tax regime: While
42 See Wellisch (2000) who refers to this extension as the modified Henry George theorem.
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the residence principle is optimal in the absence of migration, the source
principle is welfare maximizing once mobility of labor is allowed for.
An interior solution can, however, only be established in case of a publicly
provided private good. This entails that the optimal size of the domestic
population is indeterminate. Since the social benefit of migration vanishes,
the optimal tax system coincides with the one derived in the absence of mi-
gration, including vanishing tax rates on residents’ domestic capital income.
In case of a publicly provided private good, the general conclusion of stan-
dard models of optimal taxation of capital income can be confirmed even in
the presence of migration: From the point of view of a small open economy,
it is optimal not to tax internationally mobile capital at source. Moreover, to
avoid distortions in the intertemporal savings decision, capital income should
not be taxed in the long-run. Taxes on labor income are only used to the
extent to which this production factor induces congestion costs.
2.7 Conclusion
The present research extends previous studies on capital income taxation
in dynamic general equilibrium frameworks to include migration in addition
to perfect capital mobility. Moreover, deviating from the standard Ramsey
problem of optimal taxation, the expenditure side is explicitly taken into
account. More precisely, it is assumed that governments provide a local
productive public good that is rival, but non-excludable. In such a setting,
mobility of labor is especially important since immigration of workers induces
congestion costs. To keep the analysis in line with previous studies, the case
of purely consumptive government spending has been included as well. Two
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versions of this model are considered, a basic setup with mobile capital,
and an extended version additionally incorporating a migration decision of
households.
The basic model reproduces the standard results of the literature on optimal
capital taxation, namely that residents’ returns to capital investments should
not be taxed in the long-run. Moreover, if public good provision entails con-
gestion costs induced by the aggregate labor supply, a wage tax is optimal
to internalize these social costs. Extending the framework to include labor
mobility reveals that migration does alter the optimal tax system: since la-
bor movements respond to changes in the after-tax rates of return to capital
investments, introducing migration changes the structure of the optimal tax
system: While previous studies conclude that the residence principle of tax-
ation is optimal, it is shown that the source principle is efficient if one allows
for mobile capital and labor.
Yet, an interior solution to the optimization problem can only be obtained
in case of a publicly provided private good. This entails that labor income
taxes used to internalize the congestion costs are sufficient to finance the
public good at any point in time. Put differently, average and marginal costs
of public good provision are identical, implying that the social benefit of
migration vanishes, and the optimal population size is indeterminate. As a
consequence, the optimal tax system coincides with the fiscal policy derived
in the absence of migration.
The following chapter continues to study the effects of labor mobility in a
dynamic setting, but focuses on another issue of fiscal competition: the opti-
mal education policy if high-skilled workers are perfectly mobile. Moreover,
the issue of interregional externalities resulting from migration will be dis-
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cussed. While the present analysis focuses on the optimal tax system of a
small open economy, this need not be efficient from a global point of view
since the possibility of migration generates an interregional externality that
is not accounted for at the country level. To see this, consider a situation
in which all countries are endowed with a suboptimally low population size
except for a single country in which the population level is optimal. This
single country will try to establish a fiscal policy that maintains the initial
population distribution, not taking into account the possibly larger benefits
for other regions that go ahead with an alternative distribution. Hence, the
regional optimum need not coincide with the global first-best. Under which
circumstances local decision making can replicate the global welfare optimum
will be one of the issues addressed in the proceeding chapter.
Chapter 3
Optimal Education Policies
3.1 Motivation
The introductory chapter has summarized basic empirical facts on migration
trends, that suggest an increasing mobility of labor in the years to come
due to a rapid decline in transaction costs. Administrative or legal barriers
have been reduced in highly integrated regions such as the European Union,
while language or cultural obstacles to migration are of minor importance in
federal states. Moreover, the mobility of labor increases with the skill level
as specialized skills of highly educated workers may be locally less demanded
and, hence, require searching a geographically larger labor market. In view
of the high mobility especially of skilled labor, benefits resulting from local
investments in education do not necessarily accrue to the region of origin.
This chapter represents research I undertook within the priority program ”Institu-
tional Design of Federal Systems: Theory and Empirical Evidence” of the Deutsche
Forschungsgemeinschaft (DFG). I would like to thank Andreas Haufler, Malte Hu¨bner,
Wolfram Richter, and Christian Bayer for helpful comments and suggestions. Financial
support by the Deutsche Forschungsgemeinschaft is gratefully acknowledged.
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Therefore, public incentives to promote mobility enhancing education might
be limited. Rather, it seems to be tempting to attract skilled labor from
abroad using a favorable tax system and free-ride on other regions’ education
policies. Hence, high-skilled mobility can be problematic for decentralized
fiscal policies.
The present chapter analyzes this free-rider problem at the level of local juris-
dictions in a setup that allows for social mobility across skill types. Individual
underinvestment in education provides a rationale for educational subsidies
from a federal point of view.1 Local governments, however, might refrain
from subsidizing education in the presence of high-skilled migration. Since
the size of the educated workforce available in the respective jurisdiction is
no longer determined by domestic educational investments but by migration
flows, local governments might lose the incentive to correct private underin-
vestment. This suggests that decentralized education policies are inefficient,
and educational subsidies have to be provided at the federal or supra-national
level. Yet, local governments do engage in education policies and subsidize
especially early education substantially. The present analysis provides an
explanation for this phenomenon and shows that local governments do not
free-ride on other regions’ education policies, even though high-skilled work-
ers are assumed to be perfectly mobile.
1 Private underinvestment can result due to various reasons such as externalities or credit
constraints and constitutes just one exemplary rationale for government intervention.
Andersson and Konrad (2006) provide a detailed overview over various motivations for
public education policies.
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3.2 Related Literature
Most previous studies stress an efficiency enhancing aspect of migration that
implies a reduced need for public policy. Surprisingly, the recent literature
on the brain drain has emphasized this point in various studies. Typically,
research on the brain drain focuses on a less developed country and analyzes
the effect of outmigration of qualified labor to a high-wage region. Since
the destination country is not modeled explicitly, most studies prevent de-
population by assuming that migration is restricted, e.g. the probability to
emigrate is exogenously given. Against this background, the negative effects
of high-skilled migration for growth and welfare in the source country are
stressed.2 Yet, the relationship between human capital formation and the
possibility to emigrate as well as the potentially involved welfare gains have
only been recognized recently.
The welfare improving impact of migration in new approaches to the brain
drain rests on the observation that an exogenous increase in the migration
probability of high-skilled labor fosters private educational investments as
in Stark et al. (1998). Starting from a situation of educational underinvest-
ment that is induced by externalities, increasing the probability to emigrate
raises private incentives to accumulate human capital and, hence, promotes
welfare.3 Since educational underinvestment provides a rationale for public
intervention, migration can even function as a substitute for subsidies in edu-
cation (Stark and Wang, 2002). Yet, the positive effect of migration in these
models is based on the presumption that a fraction of the high-skilled work-
2 For a thorough review of the literature on brain drain see Commander et al. (2003).
3 The possibility of an efficiency enhancing brain drain on the basis of a probabilis-
tic approach to migration has been discussed in models with underinvestment due to
production externalities (Stark (2004); Mountford (1997)) as well as intergenerational
transmission of knowledge (Beine et al. (2001); Vidal (1998)).
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force cannot migrate. The brain drain is thereby exogenously restricted and
increased educational incentives enhance the aggregate human capital sup-
ply in the source country. One exception is the study by Stark et al. (1997),
who consider asymmetric information between the migrant and the foreign
employer: the latter only discovers the true productivity of the migrant with
delay. Yet, once this information has been revealed, wage payments for low-
productivity migrants decline and induce return migration. This implies that
educational investments, which initially increase mobility but entail the pos-
sibility of return migration, turn out to be beneficial for the source country
as soon as return migration becomes profitable.
Similar to new approaches to the brain drain, migration can enhance effi-
ciency in a setup in which private underinvestment results from uncertainty.
Wildasin (2000b) considers a framework in which high-skilled workers pos-
sess industry-specific human capital. This implies that qualified labor is
intersectorally immobile and, therefore, exposed to earning risks. If educa-
tion is privately financed and wage risks are uninsurable,4 globalization that
raises the geographical mobility of high-skilled labor provides full insurance
of the involved income risks. As a consequence, investments in human capital
increase to an efficient level.5
At the same time, migration can restore efficiency in a setup where educa-
tional subsidies are used to overcome a hold-up problem of time-inconsistent
taxation. Boadway et al. (1996) consider human capital formation in a closed
economy. They point out that if governments cannot commit to future tax
4 Wildasin (2000b) analyzes the effect of high-skilled labor mobility for the case of private
as well as public investments in education.
5 In a comparable approach, Poutvaara (2000, 2001) model wage-tax financed educa-
tional transfers to students as an insurance against regions-specific shocks. Against
this background, the trade-off between the efficiency enhancing effect of mobility and
the possible erosion of local tax policies due to tax competition is assessed.
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policies, they have an incentive to revise their policy and tax labor income
excessively once human capital has been accumulated and is in fixed supply.
Rational households anticipate this change in fiscal policy and underinvest
in education, which implies that public intervention such as providing ed-
ucational subsidies can improve efficiency. Andersson and Konrad (2003a)
argue that alternatively allowing for mobility of labor reintroduces the elas-
ticity of the tax base and serves as a commitment device for low tax rates.6
Against this background, they determine the welfare effects of globalization
when education is risky.7
The studies cited above suggest that an increase in labor mobility should be
accompanied by a decline in public investments due to a reduced need for
fiscal policies. The present research does not intend to cast doubt on this
efficiency enhancing effect of migration. Yet, it is presumed that mobility of
high-skilled workers will most likely not entirely restore efficiency. If migra-
tion fails to exactly offset the inefficiencies, private underinvestment persists.
This calls for public policies to correct the underlying market failure. How-
ever, from the point of view of a small jurisdiction facing migration of highly
educated workers, the size of the high-skilled workforce available depends on
migration flows alone and not on previous local investments in education.
6 The fact that mobility of labor can improve efficiency as the involved elasticity of
the tax base forces local jurisdictions to behave optimally is also stressed by Wellisch
and Richter (1995). Here long-lived pollutants impose a cost on future generations
that is not accounted for today. Yet, mobility of households introduces the possibility
to escape these costs and induces optimizing governments to properly internalize the
intergenerational pollution externality.
7 Thum and Uebelmesser (2003) build on this efficiency enhancing effect of migration
in a setup where human capital accumulation can contain country-specific as well as
internationally applicable knowledge such as language skills. By investing in mobility-
increasing education of the young, the old generation who decides on redistributive
fiscal policies can bind itself to low tax rates. In contrast, Leviathan governments try
to prevent mobility-increasing education in the first place, as Andersson and Konrad
(2003b) show in a framework with just one type of education.
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Therefore, the possibility to free-ride on other regions’ educational invest-
ments arises, and decentralized policies in the presence of labor mobility
might not be efficient anymore. As Sinn (1997) puts it, fiscal competition
reduces the incentives of governments to correct market failures.
The above-mentioned study by Wildasin (2000b) additionally considers the
case of public investment in human capital. It is shown that if education
is financed publicly, tax competition for high-skilled workers results in pub-
lic underinvestment. Hence, decentralized education policies turn out to be
inefficient. Similarly, Justman and Thisse (1997, 2000) develop a model in
which the number of school places and, consequently, the supply of skilled
workers is entirely determined by public instead of private investments. Their
analysis demonstrates that mobility of high-skilled labor induces underpro-
vision of public education if regions interact strategically.8 To restore local
incentives for public provision of education, a system of interjurisdictional
transfers based on migration flows is suggested.
Poutvaara and Kanniainen (2000) focus on a situation of private underinvest-
ment in human capital that results from intragenerational spillovers between
students. They point out that low-ability agents have an incentive to partly
finance corrective educational policies in a closed economy setup. This is
due to the fact that low-skilled workers gain directly from efficient levels of
educational investments as their wage income increases with the size of the
complementary high-skilled workforce. Yet, once the educated are able to
migrate, it is not clear whether the domestic economy can fully capture the
benefits of previous educational investments. Therefore, analogously to small
open jurisdictions, low-ability workers have an incentive to free-ride on other
8 This result has recently been confirmed by Egger et al. (2007), allowing for an endoge-
nous educational choice of individuals and asymmetries between countries.
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regions education policies instead of correcting educational underinvestment
themselves. Similarly, Del Rey (2001) analyzes possible free-riding of foreign
students who benefit from public education, but do not contribute to the
tax system. It is shown that fiscal competition results in underprovision of
education if price discrimination is not allowed for.
The cited studies on education policies in the presence of migration conclude
that government activity in this area will decline if mobility rises, either due
to a reduced need for fiscal intervention or due to diminished incentives to
correct market failures. Nevertheless, comparing the years 1995 and 2001,
78 percent of all OECD countries for which data is available refrained from
lowering their public expenditures on education relative to the aggregate
public budget, despite of the rising mobility of labor. In fact, the proportion
of total public expenditures that were spent on education was increased on
average from 11.8 to 12.7 percent.9 This trend can be confirmed if one con-
siders education policies of the fifteen EU member states in 1995 and 2001.
Between these countries, barriers to migration have been reduced substan-
tially resulting in a labor market that by far exceeds national boundaries.
Consequently, they seem to be natural candidates to observe a reduction in
public educational expenditures as a response to increased labor mobility.
Figure (3.1) depicts the change in the educational expenditure ratio, that is
the change in public educational spending relative to the aggregate public
budget, between 1995 and 2001. The graph reveals that public spending on
education grew faster than total public spending in nearly all EU member
9 The calculations are based on the OECD indicator ”Relative proportion of public
and private investment in educational institutions” (OECD (2004), Table B4.1). The
indicator relates public expenditures on education to total public spending for the
years 1995 and 2001. Note that public education comprises direct public spending on
educational institutions as well as public subsidies such as scholarships and subsidies
on student living costs.
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states covered. The following analysis provides a theoretical explanation why
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Figure 3.1: Change in public expenditure on education as percentage of total
public spending, 1995-2001
Source: Author’s calculations based on OECD (2004), Table B4.1.
public expenditure on education does not decline despite of the observable
increase in high-skilled mobility.
The focus of the present study lies on the incentives of local jurisdictions
to correct underinvestment in education, while positive efficiency enhancing
effects of migration at the private level are ignored. This research contributes
to the literature as it develops a dynamic framework capable of integrating
social mobility as an additional dimension of labor mobility. Consequently,
lacking governmental support of education cannot be compensated by immi-
gration as it additionally affects the number of immobile low-skilled workers
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in a respective region. As a result, local governments stick to the optimal
decision rule for subsidizing education despite of the mobility of educated
workers, and decentralized decision making remains to be efficient.
Only if one allows for high- and low-skilled mobility, local incentives to correct
the underinvestment problem vanish as education policies neither affect the
size of the domestic high- nor of the low-skilled workforce. This implies
that private underinvestment in education persists. To correct the market
failure and establish the social optimum in a decentralized setting in which
both types of workers are perfectly mobile across regions, a federal matching
grant can be used. However, such a federal matching grant effectively assigns
the education policy to the federal or supranational level.
The subsequent chapter is organized as follows: In Section 3.3, the basic
model setup is described with a special emphasis on the educational process
and the migration dynamics. Section 3.4 and 3.5 derive the optimal fiscal
policies a unitary state government chooses and discuss what policy instru-
ments are needed to decentralize the welfare optimum. Firstly, the case of
perfect mobility of the educated workforce is considered, and then migration
of high- as well as low-skilled labor is allowed for. The last section concludes.
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3.3 The Model
Consider a federal economy with a large number of small local jurisdictions
i = 1, ..., m.10 Each of these jurisdictions represents a local tax authority
that can raise lump-sum taxes to finance educational subsidies, given the
fiscal policy decided by the central government. Initially, and before any
migration takes place, the population of region i consists of a fixed number
of high-skilled (NH0,i) and low-skilled households (N
L
0,i).
Moreover, the federation is populated by successive generations. Every house-
hold or parent has one offspring and invests an amount ent in the education of
this child, where n = H,L indicates the respective type of the parent. This
educational investment determines the child’s probability of becoming high-
skilled. Thus, while the overall size of the population is fixed over time with
N¯ =
m∑
i=1
(
NHt,i +N
L
t,i
)
∀t ≥ 0, the evolution of types depends on the regional
investments in education.
The timing of events is as follows: The central government moves first, de-
ciding on the sequence of fiscal policies that maximizes the welfare of the
aggregate federal population. It is assumed that the federal government has
access to a commitment technology that fully binds it to the announced tax
policy. The local governments move next, behaving like small open economies
when choosing the sequence of regional tax rates, followed by private agents,
who take all tax rates as given. Note that time-inconsistency of local fiscal
policies is not an issue here, because households are not optimizing intertem-
porally. Thus, the possibility of a future revision of the initially announced
path of optimal policy will not influence the decisions of the working popu-
10 This assumption allows to abstract from any strategic interaction between regions.
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lation as these are only affected by current tax rates.11
The basic model setup follows Boadway et al. (2003), who analyze fiscal
equalization in a static model with two types of mobile labor. Their work
is extended to a dynamic framework with successive generations and an en-
dogenous human capital formation process to study the consequences of labor
mobility for optimal education policies. The production of human capital is
based on a setup suggested by Cremer and Pestieau (2006). In their model,
the educational success is determined by an endogenously derived probability
of becoming high-skilled. In the present research, this is interpreted as social
mobility which reflects the fact that children of both low- and high-skilled
parents face a positive probability to become high-skilled themselves. The
approach makes it possible to analyze fiscal policies that not only affect the
allocation of the mobile factor across regions, but additionally determine the
endowment with the factor across time.
3.3.1 Regional Production
In every period t ≥ 1, firms produce a single aggregate good that can be
used for consumption and investments in education. Labor is the only input
factor with high-skilled (NHt,i) and low-skilled households (N
L
t,i) being perfect
substitutes. Households supply zn efficiency units of labor inelastically, with
n = H,L denoting the respective skill group, and it is assumed that high-
skilled labor is more productive (zH > zL). Aggregate effective labor supply
can be written as Zt,i = z
HNHt,i + z
LNLt,i.
11 As Kydland and Prescott (1977) point out, time inconsistencies arise solely in situations
in which the current optimization behaviour of agents is influenced by their expectations
of future fiscal policies.
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Firms in every region have access to the production function F (Zt,i) with
F ′(Zt,i) > 0 > F
′′(Zt,i). As an example one can think of the following
production technology
F (Zt,i) = (Zt,i)
α , (3.1)
where 0 < α < 1 denotes the production elasticity of labor. Labor markets
are competitive, therefore the wage rate equals the marginal product of labor.
As the production function exhibits decreasing returns to scale, local rents
arise. The rent income of region i is given by R(Zt,i) = F (Zt,i)−Zt,iF ′(Zt,i)
with R′(Zt,i) = −Zt,iF ′′(Zt,i) > 0. It is assumed that these rents accrue to
the regional government.12 Since regions have access to the same production
technology, that is fiscal capacities of local jurisdictions do not differ, there
is no need for federal equalization. This implies that it is irrelevant whether
the rents are appropriated by the regional or central government. In con-
trast, with private ownership of the fixed factor, source income arises that
induces an additional fiscal externality of migration. To focus on the impact
of migration on optimal education policies, additional inefficiencies resulting
from private rent income should be avoided, and it is assumed that the local
governments receive the entire rent income.
3.3.2 Central and Local Governments
Both the central and the regional governments are benevolent in the sense
that they maximize the sum of their residents’ utility, discounted over all
periods. In other words, governments care about the aggregate welfare of
12 This can be justified by the implicit assumption that either the local jurisdiction is the
owner of the fixed factor who generates the rents, or that it has access to a rent tax to
fully appropriate the pure profit.
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each parent generation living in the respective region. The central govern-
ment has access to a federal lump-sum tax θnt,i, which can be differentiated
both across regions and across skill-types. Furthermore, it can choose a skill-
specific matching grant θnet,i paid to regions for every unit invested locally in
education. The budget constraint of the federal government can be written
as ∑
i
∑
n
Nnt,i
(
θnt,i − θ
n
et,ie
n
t,i
)
= 0. (3.2)
The set of available tax instruments at the local level of government is re-
stricted to a skill-specific head tax on residents (τnt ) and a skill-specific ed-
ucational subsidy or tax (τnet). The budget of a representative jurisdiction i
additionally includes the regional rent and the federal matching grant,
∑
n
Nnt,i
(
τnt,i −
[
τnet,i − θ
n
et,i
]
ent,i
)
+R(Zt,i) = 0. (3.3)
3.3.3 Household Behavior
Following Cremer and Pestieau (2006),13 successive generations of two types
of labor, namely low-skilled (NLt ) and high-skilled (N
H
t ), are assumed.
14 Each
of these workers has one offspring and is, hence, also referred to as a parent.
Parents invest an amount ent in the education of their children and thereby
determine the probability of their child to become high-skilled, h(ent ) with
hne > 0 and h
n
ee < 0. While young, children undergo education, but only
enter the model explicitly when old, that is, once they have completed their
education and start working as either high- or low-skilled. Note that individ-
13 Cremer and Pestieau (2006) consider an immobile workforce and study optimal educa-
tion policies when private investment, which can be supplemented by public investment,
is not observable.
14 The region index i is suppressed for the moment.
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uals do not decide on their own education, but only on the amount invested
in their children. Thus, the model rather depicts basic or early education as
compared to college or university education.
The probability to become high-skilled and, thus, high-productive is derived
endogenously as a function of the different educational investments of the
respective type of parent: The probability to become high-skilled is h(eHt )
if parents are high-skilled, and h(eLt ) if they are low-skilled. Since children
of high- and low-skilled parents both face a positive probability of becoming
high-skilled, the model allows for social mobility across skill types.
However, in the absence of any fiscal policy, children of high-skilled parents
face a higher probability of becoming high-skilled themselves. This is due
to the fact that high-skilled parents are more productive and earn a higher
wage income. Consequently, they spend more resources on education than
low-skilled parents do. As the amount invested by parents is determined by
the net earnings realized by the respective type, social mobility is contingent
on the productivity and eventually on the educational background of par-
ents. Therefore, the model additionally captures intergenerational earnings
persistence which can, however, be reduced using educational subsidies.
The proposed framework replicates basic findings of the recent literature
that stress the importance of early investments in shaping the cognitive abil-
ity of children that in turn determines their future educational success as well
as their income prospects. Restuccia and Urrutia (2004) calibrate a model
in which innate ability, acquired ability, based on parental investments in
early education, and college education determine the probability of success-
ful college graduation. They show that parental investments in education,
especially early education, account for nearly one-half of the observed inter-
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generational earnings persistence. This evidence suggests that social mobility
can be increased substantially by the provision of educational subsidies on
private investments in early education. Additionally, Carneiro and Heck-
man (2002) stress the importance of long-run factors to explain the positive
correlation between college enrolment and family income. They argue that
children from high-income families have better access to resources that pro-
vide them with higher quality of education early in life leading to superior
cognitive ability in the long-run.
Assuming large numbers, the size of the aggregate high-skilled labor force in
period t can be derived on the basis of parent’s educational investment in
period t− 1,
NHt = N
H
t−1 · h(e
H
t−1) +N
L
t−1 · h(e
L
t−1). (3.4)
Analogously, the number of low-skilled workers can be deduced,
NLt = N
H
t−1 · (1− h(e
H
t−1)) +N
L
t−1 · (1− h(e
L
t−1)). (3.5)
After the educational process determined the respective type, the child en-
ters the working period as either high- or low-skilled, supplying zn efficiency
units of labor inelastically to firms in the region of residence. The resulting
labor income is spend on consumption, tax payments as well as net invest-
ment in the education of children. The household’s budget constraint can be
expressed as
znF ′(Zt)− τ
n
t − θ
n
t = c
n
t + (1− τ
n
et)e
n
t , (3.6)
where cnt denotes consumption and e
n
t investment in education of children.
Note that a consumption tax is not allowed for at neither level of government.
As far as type-specific consumption taxes are concerned, no further insights
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can be expected as both the consumption tax as well as the educational
subsidy decrease the opportunity cost of investments in education and are,
consequently, perfect substitutes. Moreover, a consumption tax is typically
not differentiated across skill-types and, therefore, displays an inferior tax
instrument as it cannot mimic type-specific education policies.15
Parents are altruistic in the sense that they experience a joy of giving when
supporting their children’s education (warm glow altruism). Preferences of
different skill types are identical and additively separable between consump-
tion and educational investments. They can be expressed by the strictly
concave utility function
U(cnt , e
n
t ) = u(c
n
t ) + υ(e
n
t ). (3.7)
Households of each type maximize utility subject to their budget constraint,
taking both federal and regional tax rates as given. In the optimum, the
marginal rate of substitution between consumption and investment in edu-
cation equals the private cost of education,16
υnet
unct
= (1− τnet). (3.8)
While equations (3.4) and (3.5) underline the crucial impact of private invest-
ments in education on the composition of the future workforce, parents solely
optimize their own utility disregarding the positive effect for future genera-
15 Yet, a consumption tax will turn out to be sufficient ex post. This is due to the fact
that the assumed utilitarian welfare function entails redistribution among types. In the
resulting type-symmetric equilibrium, a universal consumption tax and a type-specific
educational subsidy are perfect substitutes.
16 In the absence of any tax or subsidy, the private cost of education in terms of con-
sumption equals one. This reflects the underlying assumption that output can be
transformed into consumption and education at no further resource cost.
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tions. Put differently, they fail to internalize their child’s benefits resulting
from these educational investments. As will be shown, this intergenerational
externality leads to inefficient levels of investment in education that can be
corrected using an educational subsidy.
3.3.4 Migration
Two different scenarios of migration are considered: mobility of the high-
skilled workforce and mobility of both the high- and the low-skilled work-
force. For simplicity, the analysis abstracts from any migrations costs such
as language barriers, moving costs or attachment to the home country.17 Mi-
gration takes place at the beginning of every period t ≥ 1, before households
decide on consumption and educational spending. Hence, migration flows
determine the current working population of a respective region i in every
period t.
A potential migrant is indifferent between migrating or staying as soon as
utility is equalized across regions.18 Thus, a migration equilibrium between
any region i 6= j and an arbitrarily chosen reference region j is characterized
17 As will be discussed below, this assumption influences the equilibrium attained. How-
ever, it has no impact on the results concerning the efficiency of regional education
policies.
18 Typically, a migration equilibrium in the presence of mobile labor is characterized by
an equalization of the net wage rate. As long as the entire net income is spend on con-
sumption, this corresponds to an equalization of utility levels. Yet, in the present setup,
the net income can be spend on consumption and educational investments. Moreover,
households are confronted with interregionally different shadow prices for education.
Similarly to the case of provision of public consumption goods, it is, therefore, not plau-
sible to assume that migration flows result in an equalization of net wage rates. Rather,
movements of labor will occur until the attainable utility levels will be equalized.
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by identical utility levels,
u(cnt,i) + υ(e
n
t,i) = u(c
n
t,j) + υ(e
n
t,j). (3.9)
Equation (3.9) implicitly defines the quantity of mobile labor allocated in a
particular region after a migration equilibrium has been reached.
By introducing mobility of households, the constraints for fiscal policies both
at the federal and at the local level are affected. While in a closed economy
the number of low- and high-skilled workers available in a particular region
is fully determined by investments in education, this is no longer true if
one considers migration. Rather, migration incentives are crucial for the
allocation across regions. Yet, the size of the mobile population group in the
federal state as a whole is still contingent on regional investments in education
and is, hence, restricted. The federal government takes this into account,
while the government of a small open region views the supply of the mobile
factor as infinitely elastic. It is important to point out that as long as solely
mobility of the high-skilled is allowed for, a local jurisdiction perceives the
number of the immobile low-skilled workforce as dependent on local human
capital formation. With mobility of high- and low-skilled, however, migration
flows alone determine the allocation of types across regions.
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3.4 Optimal Education Policies with High-
Skilled Migration
In the following section, optimal education policies at both the federal and
regional level of government are studied. In the first subsection, it is shown
that parents underinvest in education. This inefficiency justifies federal ed-
ucation policies on efficiency grounds. Yet, if one considers the possibility
of migration, a free-rider problem at the level of regional governments might
arise. Since, from a local perspective, the size of the mobile workforce no
longer depends on educational investments but on migration incentives, ju-
risdictions might substitute efficiency enhancing education subsidies by fiscal
policies that aim at attracting migrants. In the absence of federal education
policies, private underinvestment in education might, therefore, persist. The
second subsection analyzes if this regional free-rider problem indeed occurs
and federal education policies are needed to correct the intergenerational
inefficiency. To this end, the unitary state optimum is derived as a bench-
mark case. Subsequently, regional policies as well as federal tax instruments
capable of decentralizing the first best optimum are discussed.
3.4.1 Unitary State Optimum
Consider a unitary state government that is benevolent in the sense that it
maximizes a utilitarian welfare function, summed up over all generations and
discounted by the social rate of time preference, 0 < β < 1. To characterize
the central planning solution as a benchmark case, assume that the unitary
state government does not only decide on federal taxes, but also optimally
chooses the tax instruments available to regions.
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The unitary state government optimizes social welfare by choosing the tax
rates
{
τnt,i, θ
n
t,i, θ
n
et,i
}
as well as the allocations
{
cnt,i, e
n
t,i, N
n
t,i
}
. The population
Nnt,i is treated as an artificial control variable, since the human capital forma-
tion constraint as well as the migration equilibrium are added as constraints
to the optimization problem. Alternatively, one can use the two constraints
to determine the respective population group as an endogenous variable, de-
pending on the different tax rates and allocations. Note that the household’s
first-order condition has been used to eliminate τnet,i from the central planner’s
optimization problem.
The optimization problem is to solve
max
∞∑
t=1
βt
{ ∑
i
∑
n
Nnt,i
[
u
(
cnt,i
)
+ υ(ent,i)
]
+
∑
i
∑
n
κnt,i
[
znF ′(Zt,i)− τ
n
t,i − θ
n
t,i − c
n
t,i −
υnet,i
unct,i
ent,i
]
+ λt
∑
i
∑
n
Nnt,i
(
θnt,i − θ
n
et,ie
n
t,i
)
+
∑
i
λt,i
[∑
n
Nnt,i(τ
n
t,i +
υnet,i
unct,i
ent,i −
(
1− θnet,i
)
ent,i) +R(Zt,i)
]
(3.10)
+
∑
i
µLt,i
[
NLt+1,i −
∑
n
Nnt,i
[
1− h(ent,i)
]]
+ µt
[
N¯ −
∑
i
∑
n
Nnt,i
]
+
∑
i6=j
ϕHt,i
[
u(cHt,j) + υ(e
H
t,j)− u
(
cHt,i
)
− υ(eHt,i)
] }
,
where the variables κnt,i, λt, λt,i, µ
L
t,i, µt and ϕ
H
t,i denote the Lagrange-multipliers
on the respective optimization constraints. The first constraint guarantees
that the household’s budget is balanced. The next two constraints refer
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to the federal and regional budget that are distinguished to keep the solu-
tion comparable to the regional optimization discussed below. The fourth
constraint reflects the fact that the size of a region’s immobile low-skilled
population in period t + 1 is contingent on local educational investments in
period t. The remaining constraints illustrate that the exogenously given
aggregate labor force N¯t consists of high- and low-skilled labor allocated in
one of the regions and that the mobility of high-skilled workers requires that
the migration constraint is met. Since the size of the low-skilled workforce
is determined by the human capital formation constraint, the population re-
striction characterizes the aggregate size of the high-skilled workforce. The
migration constraint then identifies the allocation of theses educated workers
across regions, demanding the utility level in region i to equal the utility at-
tainable in an arbitrarily chosen reference region j. The first-order conditions
of the social planning problem are stated in Appendix B.1.1.
Optimal Policy Rule
The first-order conditions with respect to τnt,i, θ
n
t,i and θ
n
et,i reveal that κ
n
t,i =
λt,iN
n
t,i and λt,i = λt. This reduces the first-order conditions on consumption
and educational spending for the low-skilled residing in region i to
uLct,i = λt and υ
L
et,i + µ
L
t,ih
L
et,i = λt. (3.11)
Equations (3.11) define the equilibrium values of cLt,i and e
L
t,i and can be used
to derive the social marginal rate of substitution between consumption and
investments in education,
υLet,i
uLct,i
= 1−
µLt,i
λt
hLet,i. (3.12)
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In the welfare optimum, the social marginal rate of substitution has to equal
the private cost of education minus the term
µLt,i
λt
hLet,i that captures an ex-
ternal effect of education. This external effect of education consists of the
welfare impact of a declining number of low-skilled in t+1 (µLt,i), weighted by
the marginal productivity of low-skilled educational investments (hLet,i > 0)
and discounted by the opportunity cost, the marginal utility of consumption
(λt > 0). If the contribution to aggregate welfare of a high-skilled worker
exceeds the benefit of her being low-skilled, the external effect of education is
positive. This implies that investments in education should take place until
the marginal rate of substitution exceeds the private costs of education of one
by additionally accounting for the social benefit of human capital formation.
Since in a decentralized market equilibrium this optimal marginal rate of
substitution has to equal the private marginal rate of substitution (equation
(3.8)), the optimal policy rule to determine the educational subsidy or tax
for the low-skilled in region i can be deduced,
1−
µLt,i
λt
hLet,i =
υLet,i
uLct,i
= (1− τLet,i) ⇔ τ
L
et,i =
µLt,i
λt
hLet,i. (3.13)
In the absence of any education policy, households adjust their marginal rate
of substitution to the marginal private cost of educational investment of one
(equation (3.8)). Hence, they do not take into account the external effect of
education, and private investment will be inefficient. The educational subsidy
or tax is a means of internalizing this external effect and of establishing the
welfare optimum. As long as the external effect of education is positive
(µLt,i > 0), it is optimal to subsidize educational investments.
Similarly, one can rewrite the first-order conditions with respect to consump-
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tion and educational investment for the high-skilled type in region i,(
NHt,i − ϕ
H
t,i
)
NHt,i
uHct,i = λt and
(
NHt,i − ϕ
H
t,i
)
NHt,i
υHet,i + µ
L
t,ih
H
et,i = λt. (3.14)
Again, equations (3.14) define the equilibrium values of cHt,i and e
H
t,i. More-
over, the social marginal rate of substitution between consumption and edu-
cational investments involves the external effect of education,
υHet,i
uHct,i
= 1−
µLt,i
λt
hHet,i. (3.15)
This implies that - similarly to the low-skilled case - a subsidy or tax on
educational investments should be used to internalize the social effect of
education. Following the above procedure, the optimal educational subsidy
or tax on high-skilled investments can be obtained as
τHet,i =
µLt,i
λt
hHet,i. (3.16)
Proposition 6 The optimal educational policy rule of a benevolent unitary
state government aims at internalizing the external effect of education.
One can further simplify the educational subsidy using the first-order con-
ditions on consumption and educational investments (equations (3.11) and
(3.14)) to substitute out the Lagrange-multipliers λt and µ
L
t,i,
τnet,i =
µLt,i
λt
hnet,i =
unct,i − υ
n
et,i
unct,i
. (3.17)
Equation (3.17) reveals that the optimal policy rule for subsidizing education
is only dependent on the realized equilibrium values of consumption and
education. Therefore, it is not influenced by assumptions on the migration
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dynamics or the underlying production technology.19
Intraregional Redistribution
To determine the redistribution policy, consider a situation in which the mi-
gration equilibrium constraint is not binding (ϕHt,i = 0). The welfare optimum
will then coincide with the central planning solution derived in a setup where
interregional migration is prohibited. Yet, it will be shown that the equilib-
rium deduced is symmetric and, consequently, satisfies the required utility
equalization as well. Hence, the solution obtained ignoring the migration con-
straint coincides with the one for the fully constrained optimization problem
and characterizes the unitary state optimum with high-skilled migration.
In case of a non-binding migration constraint, the first-order conditions as
stated in equations (3.11) and (3.14) become
unct,i = λt and υ
n
et,i + µ
L
t,ih
n
et,i = λt. (3.18)
It follows that consumption and educational investments in a particular re-
gion are type-independent (cnt,i = ct,i and e
n
t,i = et,i). Since preferences are
the same, it follows that utility levels across types will be equalized. This
is due to the fact that the unitary state government aims at maximizing a
utilitarian welfare function. To see this, consider a situation in which the
level of educational spending of different types is identical, but high-skilled
consumption exceeds low-skilled consumption. In this case, the marginal
utility of additional consumption is higher for the low-skilled type. There-
fore, redistribution that increases low-skilled consumption at the expense of
19 While the policy rule remains unaffected, the assumptions certainly influence the equi-
librium obtained.
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high-skilled consumption generates a welfare gain.
Notice that consumption is independent of the place of residence (ct,i = ct),
while this need not be the case for educational investments: As long as the
Lagrange-multiplier on the human capital formation constraint, µLt,i, is not
identical across regions, the level of spending on education will differ as well.
Alternatively, one can use equation (3.18) to express µLt,i as a function of
consumption as well as regional investments in education. Consequently, any
interregional difference in µLt,i is accompanied by different levels of educational
expenditures in the respective regions.
Identical consumption and investment levels between types in a single region
entail that the optimal subsidy or tax on education is independent of the
respective type,
τet,i =
µLt,i
λt
het,i. (3.19)
This implies that in the optimum parents from either type spend an equal
amount of resources on consumption and educational investments. According
to the household’s budget constraint, identical spending patterns can only be
achieved if the net income of high- and low-skilled is equalized across types,
zHF ′(Zt,i)− τ
H
t,i − θ
H
t,i = ct,i + (1− τet,i)et,i = z
LF ′(Zt,i)− τ
L
t,i − θ
L
t,i. (3.20)
Since productivity differs, the aggregate head tax on high-skilled has to ex-
ceed the one on low-skilled workers,
(
zH − zL
)
F ′(Zt,i) =
(
τHt,i + θ
H
t,i
)
−
(
τLt,i + θ
L
t,i
)
> 0. (3.21)
Lump-sum taxes that account for the productivity difference between the two
types, combined with type-independent educational subsidies, guarantee that
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the net income is identical. Such a way of redistribution between high- and
low-skilled workers ensures that consumption and educational investments
are the same entailing that realized utility levels are type-independent and
aggregate welfare is maximized.
Proposition 7 A benevolent unitary state government redistributes income
from high- to low-skilled labor to achieve a type-symmetric intraregional equi-
librium.
Still, it is not clear a priori whether education should be subsidized or taxed.
To determine the sign of the educational subsidy, one needs to evaluate the
shadow price µLt,i associated with the probability of being low-productive.
Using the first-order conditions on τnt,i, θ
n
t,i and θ
n
et,i as well as the fact that
R′(Zt,i) = −Zt,iF ′′(Zt,i) and
υnet,i
unct,i
= (1− τnet,i), one can simplify the first-order
condition with respect to NHt,i to
µt = U
H
t,i(·) + λt
(
θHt,i + τ
H
t,i − τ
H
et,ie
H
t,i
)
− µLt,i
[
1− h(eHt,i)
]
. (3.22)
Equation (3.22) captures the contribution to social welfare of an additional
high-skilled individuum. This net benefit of being high-skilled comprises the
attained level of utility and the fiscal revenue raised, weighted by the marginal
utility of consumption (λt), minus the probability that the respective type’s
child will later become low-skilled, weighted by the social value of education
(µLt,i).
Similarly, one can rewrite the first-order condition with respect to NLt,i,
µt = U
L
t,i(·) + λt
(
θLt,i + τ
L
t,i − τ
L
et,ie
L
t,i
)
− µLt,i
[
1− h(eLt,i)
]
+ β−1µLt−1,i. (3.23)
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To solve for the shadow price µLt−1,i that captures the social benefit of turning
a child in period t−1 into a high-skilled instead of a low-skilled worker, equate
(3.22) with (3.23),
β−1µLt−1,i = U
H
t,i(·)− U
L
t,i(·) + µ
L
t,i
[
h(eHt,i)− h(e
L
t,i)
]
+λt
[(
θHt,i + τ
H
t,i − τ
H
et,ie
H
t,i
)
−
(
θLt,i + τ
L
t,i − τ
L
et,ie
L
t,i
)]
. (3.24)
This social benefit of education consists of the differences in each type’s
contribution to social welfare, that is the differences with respect to the
utility levels achieved, the net fiscal revenue raised, as well as the impact on
human capital formation.
According to the optimal policy rule (equation (3.17)), it is efficient to sub-
sidize education as long as the contribution to social welfare of an additional
high-skilled exceeds the contribution of a low-skilled worker (µLt,i > 0). Given
the symmetric equilibrium outcomes derived above and accounting for in-
traregional redistribution policies (equation (3.21)), the net social benefit of
education reduces to the difference in productivity between the two types,
β−1µLt−1,i = λt
[(
θHt,i + τ
H
t,i
)
−
(
θLt,i + τ
L
t,i
)]
= λt
(
zH − zL
)
F ′(Zt,i) > 0. (3.25)
For the subsequent analysis it is important to note that equation (3.25) can
be used to express the marginal productivity of labor as a function of the
Lagrange-multipliers λt and µ
L
t−1,i. Interregional differences in the aggregate
effective labor supply, therefore, involve differences in the Lagrange-multiplier
µLt−1,i , which in turn is determined by the level of local educational spending.
The analysis reveals that the social benefit of turning a child into a high-
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instead of a low-skilled individual is strictly positive. This is due to the fact
that high-skilled workers are more productive and, hence, contribute more
in terms of tax payments than low-skilled do. Since individual households
do not take this positive external effect into account, they underinvest in
education. This explains why the optimal educational subsidy is strictly
positive with
τet,i =
µLt,i
λt
het,i > 0. (3.26)
Proposition 8 To correct private underinvestment in education, a unitary
state government subsidizes educational investments.
Note that this result hinges on the assumption that the types are perfect
substitutes in production with zH > zL. With complements, the net social
benefit of education would be positive for low levels of human capital in-
tensity, implying the optimality of a subsidy (µLt,i > 0). However, raising
the fraction of high-skilled workers would decrease the net social benefit and
eventually a tax on private educational investments would become efficient
(µLt,i < 0). Yet, the optimal decision rule for subsidizing education (equation
(3.17)) is independent of assumptions concerning the production technology.
Interregional Redistribution
An efficient allocation of labor across regions requires that the contribution
to social welfare of an additional high-skilled immigrant (equation ((3.22))
is the same for all regions. To determine the optimality condition for the
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allocation of mobile high-skilled workers, equate (3.22) across regions,
UHt,i(·) + λt
(
θHt,i + τ
H
t,i − τ
H
et,ie
H
t,i
)
− µLt,i
[
1− h(eHt,i)
]
= µt
= UHt,j(·) + λt
(
θHt,j + τ
H
t,j − τ
H
et,je
H
t,j
)
− µLt,j
[
1− h(eHt,j)
]
. (3.27)
The left-hand side of equation (3.27) can be interpreted as the net social ben-
efit of migration that consists of the contribution of a high-skilled immigrant
in terms of the additional utility and the net tax payments region i receives,
minus the social cost, which arises if the immigrant’s child becomes low- in-
stead of high-skilled (µLt,i), weighted by the probability to become low-skilled
(1 − h(eHt,i)). The optimal allocation of high-skilled between regions i and j
is attained when the net migration inefficiency, that is the difference in the
net social benefit between regions, vanishes.
One can rearrange equation (3.27) using the household’s budget constraint
to replace the individual tax payments by the difference between the wage
income and expenditures for consumption as well as educational investments,
UHt,i(·) + λt
(
zHF ′(Zt,i)− c
H
t,i − e
H
t,i
)
− µLt,i
[
1− h(eHt,i)
]
= µt
= UHt,j(·) + λt
(
zHF ′(Zt,j)− c
H
t,j − e
H
t,j
)
− µLt,j
[
1− h(eHt,j)
]
. (3.28)
As previously pointed out, with a non-binding migration constraint consump-
tion is not only type-independent but additionally identical across regions,
cnt,i = ct. This implies that utility resulting from consumption is indepen-
dent of the place of residence, u
(
cHt,i
)
= u
(
cHt
)
, and reduces equation (3.28)
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further to
υ(eHt,i) + λt
(
zHF ′(Zt,i)− e
H
t,i
)
− µLt,i
[
1− h(eHt,i)
]
= µt
= υ(eHt,j) + λt
(
zHF ′(Zt,j)− e
H
t,j
)
− µLt,j
[
1− h(eHt,j)
]
. (3.29)
Recall that interregional differences in the aggregate effective labor supply
Zt,i are associated with differences in the Lagrange-multiplier µ
L
t−1,i which, in
turn, results from unequal educational spending levels across regions. Con-
sequently, the optimal allocation of labor according to equation (3.29) only
depends on current and previous local investments in education. Focussing
on the steady-state where et,i = ei, one can reveal that the social benefit of
migration will only be equalized across regions whenever educational spend-
ing levels are identical as well. This entails that the aggregate effective labor
supply will also be independent of the respective region. An optimal interre-
gional allocation of labor, therefore, involves an equalization of productivities
across regions, that is a situation in which production efficiency holds.20 It
is important to note that the steady state assumption is not as restrictive
as it might seem on first sight. Given the optimal policy derived above, the
steady state will be attained immediately as perfectly mobile households will
relocate in the first-period, before decisions on consumption and educational
investments have been made. This entails an equalization of the aggregate
effective labor supply across regions in the first period, after which the equi-
librium paths in all regions coincide.
20 While the optimal intraregional redistribution policy as well as the educational sub-
sidy can be derived for the entire time path, interregional redistribution can only be
determined in the steady state. Notice, however, that this restriction can be avoided
applying the popular symmetry assumption: If all regions are symmetric with respect
to the initial effective labor supply, the local equilibrium paths will coincide and inter-
regional redistribution becomes redundant.
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Hence, the solution to the optimization problem is entirely symmetric with
cnt,i = c and e
n
t,i = e.
21 Moreover, it follows immediately from the educa-
tional policy rule (equation (3.17)) that the optimal subsidy is type- and
region-independent with τnet,i = τe. To derive the optimal interregional re-
distribution policy, use the steady-state equilibrium values in equation (3.27),
θHi + τ
H
i = θ
H
j + τ
H
j . (3.30)
In the welfare optimum, the central planner imposes federal lump-sum taxes
such that the aggregate head tax of the high-skilled is independent of the
region of residence.22 Given that mobile households face the same marginal
rate of substitution between consumption and investments, that is the same
educational subsidy, they will evaluate locations solely in terms of the attain-
able net income. Since aggregate head taxes are independent of the region
of residence, migration corresponds to productivity differences across regions
and leads to an equalization of the aggregate effective labor supply Zi = Z.
Proposition 9 A benevolent unitary state government uses lump-sum taxes
to equate the net social benefit of migration between regions. This ensures an
efficient allocation of mobile labor (production efficiency).
Figure (3.2) illustrates the result of production efficiency for a model econ-
omy that consists of two small regions 1 and 2.23 For clarity of presentation,
21 In contrast, the equilibrium will no longer be symmetric in the presence of migration
costs as an interregional equalization of utility would violate the migration equilibrium.
22 This result is in line with Flatters et al. (1974), who consider efficient migration in
the case of a pure public good. Since an additional migrant does not impose any
congestion costs, the optimal allocation of labor is equivalent to a setup without public
good provision.
23 The graphical illustration is inspired by Wellisch (1995), who undertakes a similar
analysis in a static model with locally congestible public good provision.
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the figure is based on the presumption that mobile households face an educa-
tional subsidy independent of the place of residence, implying that migration
responds solely to net income differences across countries. The length of the
horizontal axis depicts the aggregate effective labor supply in the economy
as a whole, consisting of low- and high-skilled workers according to previous
educational investments. Since low-skilled labor is immobile, the aggregate
regional labor supply is only influenced by high-skilled migration flows be-
tween the two regions. Thus, movements on the horizontal axis from the
left to the right side represent flows of high-skilled labor from region 2 to
region 1, increasing the aggregate effective labor supply in 1, and vice versa.
The vertical axis represent the marginal productivity of labor in the respec-
tive region, F ′(Zi), that coincides with the high-skilled wage income in the
absence of taxation. Consequently, the integral over F ′(Zi) between the ori-
gin and a particular region’s effective labor supply Zi captures the output
generated in the respective region. The aggregate production of the federal
economy is maximized in A, which represents an efficient allocation of mo-
bile labor across regions. This situation is characterized by an equalization
of the aggregate regional labor supply Zi, entailing that production efficiency
is established. Any deviation from this optimum implies a partial waste of
production possibilities.
For example, consider a situation in which the central government as well as
the local jurisdiction 2 impose head taxes on the high-skilled labor force
residing in region 2. The tax burden lowers the net income attainable
in region 2, shifting the marginal productivity net of taxes downwards to
F ′(Z2) − (θH2 + τ
H
2 ). The fall in net wage income induces emigration from
region 2 until a new equilibrium is reached in point C, where the decline in
region 2’s labor supply has increased the marginal productivity to an extent
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Figure 3.2: Production efficiency
that fully compensates high-skilled labor for the additional tax burden. The
net income in region 2 now equals the rate of return for labor in region 1.
While this situation represents a migration equilibrium, it incorporates a loss
in production that comprises the triangle ABC and results from a misalloca-
tion of labor. The central government can avoid the inefficiency induced by
tax-prone migration by imposing an identical tax burden on high-skilled re-
siding in region 1. Starting from an efficient allocation of labor, this leads to
an equal decline of net wages in both regions. Therefore, head taxes no longer
induce migration, and the efficient allocation of labor remains unaffected.
Summarizing, the starting point of the analysis was a non-binding migration
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constraint. In this case, the solution to the optimization problem is entirely
symmetric with consumption, educational investments, as well as educational
subsidies equalized both across regions and types. The central planner aims
at redistributing income across types using type-specific head taxes. In con-
trast, aggregate lump-sum taxation is independent of the place of residence
to ensure that the net social benefit of high-skilled migration is the same
across regions. As a consequence, production efficiency holds and the aggre-
gate effective labor supply is identical in all regions. Given this symmetric
solution, the migration equilibrium is fulfilled as well. Accordingly, the so-
lution that was derived ignoring the migration constraint coincides with the
optimum of the fully constrained problem. Furthermore, the solution of the
central planning problem represents a unique global maximum. This is due
to the fact that whenever utility is at least strictly quasi-concave, the con-
straints are quasi-convex, and a local maximum exists, this local maximum is
a unique global maximum.24 Notice that it is assumed throughout the entire
analysis that the aggregate federal population is large enough to ensure that
not region gets depopulated and the aggregate effective labor supply can be
equalized across regions.
The central planning solution reveals that it is optimal to subsidize education
to overcome the underinvestment problem at the private level. The following
section focuses on the optimal fiscal policy a small open region opts for. A
local government disregards the fact that the overall size of the high-skilled
population in the federal economy is contingent on private investments in
education. Hence, it might choose not to subsidize education, but try to
attract high-skilled workers from other regions. Such free-riding of regional
governments induces an educational underinvestment problem at the federal
24 For a proof of the underlying theorem see Mas-Colell et al. (1995) p. 962.
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level that might be corrected using an educational matching grant.
3.4.2 Decentralization of the Unitary State Optimum
Next, the optimal fiscal policy chosen by a local government is derived, and
necessary policy instruments at the federal state level are deduced to decen-
tralize the unitary state optimum. Recall that the first-best solution requires
(1) consumption and educational spending to be equalized across types, (2)
educational investments to be subsidized to prevent private underinvestment
and (3) production efficiency to be achieved.
From the point of view of a small open region, perfect mobility of educated
workers entails that the high-skilled workforce is in infinitely elastic supply.
Thus, a regional government will not take into account the fact that the
overall number of high-skilled available in the federal state is restricted, but
only consider the migration constraint. The amount of low-skilled workers in
any region i, however, is still contingent on local human capital formation.
Therefore, a regional jurisdiction respects the local human capital forma-
tion constraint, it’s own as well as the household’s budget constraint, and
the migration equilibrium constraint. The utility level attainable for mobile
high-skilled workers in case of emigration is exogenous with u(cHt ) + υ(e
H
t ),
where cHt and e
H
t denote the amount of consumption and educational invest-
ments realized outside of a small open region i. Furthermore, the regional
government takes the federal head tax and the matching grant as given, since
the central government is assumed to be the Stackelberg leader who moves
first. Once more, the household’s first-order condition is used to eliminate
τnet from the optimization problem.
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The local government maximizes the social welfare of it’s resident population,
choosing {τnt , c
n
t , e
n
t , N
n
t },
max
∞∑
t=0
βt
{ ∑
n
Nnt [u(c
n
t ) + υ(e
n
t )]
+
∑
n
κnt
[
znF ′(Zt)− τ
n
t − θ
n
t − c
n
t −
υnet
unct
ent
]
+λt
[∑
n
Nnt (τ
n
t +
υnet
unct
ent − (1− θ
n
et) e
n
t ) +R(Zt)
]
(3.31)
+µLt
[
NLt+1 −
∑
n
Nnt [1− h(e
n
t )]
]
+ϕHt
[
u(cHt ) + υ(e
H
t )− u(c
H
t )− υ(e
H
t )
] }
.
Again,
{
κnt , λt, µ
L
t , ϕ
H
t
}
denotes the set of Lagrange-multipliers. The first-
order conditions are left to Appendix B.1.2.
Optimal Policy Rule
To derive the regionally optimal marginal rate of substitution between con-
sumption and educational investments, use the first-order condition on τnt to
simplify the first-order conditions on consumption and investments for the
low-skilled,
uLct = λt and υ
L
et + µ
L
t h
L
et = λt
(
1− θLet
)
, (3.32)
and for the high-skilled type respectively,(
NHt − ϕ
H
t
)
NHt
uHct = λt and
(
NHt − ϕ
H
t
)
NHt
υHet+µ
L
t h
H
et = λt
(
1− θHet
)
. (3.33)
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Rearranging yields the optimal marginal rate of substitution from the point
of view of a small local jurisdiction,
υnet
unct
= (1− θnet)−
µLt
λt
hnet. (3.34)
Equating the regionally optimal and the private marginal rate of substitution
immediately reveals the optimal educational subsidy or tax a local govern-
ment chooses,
(1− θnet)−
µLt
λt
hnet =
υnet
unct
= (1− τnet) ⇔ τ
n
et =
µLt
λt
hnet + θ
n
et. (3.35)
Taking the federal grant as given, the local jurisdiction increases the educa-
tional subsidy to meet the above optimality condition. Obviously, the federal
matching grant (θnet) complements regional education policies (
µLt
λt
hnet). This
is true irrespective of whether the federal grant is paid directly to local gov-
ernments or as a federal subsidy to households.25 Yet, the federal grant
becomes redundant as an instrument to correct underinvestment, since the
region chooses the educational subsidy according to the optimal policy rule
(equation (3.17)): If the central government refrains from providing a match-
ing grant (θnet = 0), the local government imposes a tax rate according to the
rule
τnet =
µLt
λt
hnet =
unct − υ
n
et
unct
. (3.36)
Equation (3.36) reveals that in the absence of federal education policies, a
benevolent government of a small region sticks to the optimal educational
policy rule that supports the first-best, even though high-skilled workers are
perfectly mobile. Since local jurisdictions move after the central government,
25 One can easily verify that both approaches result in the exact same optimization prob-
lem.
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correcting private underinvestment in education can be delegated to the re-
gions.
Proposition 10 Local jurisdictions abide by the optimal decision rule for
subsidizing education. Thus, decentralized education policies are efficient,
although high-skilled workers are perfectly mobile.
On first sight, the efficiency of local policies seems to be in line with the
literature on public good provision where local jurisdictions facing mobile
labor continue to provide public goods according to the Samuelson condi-
tion. This point has been stressed by Boadway (1982). In the present model,
educational investments provide a joy of giving effect that is similar to the
utility increase of public goods. Yet, this is not the motive for educational
subsidies that instead aim at correcting private underinvestment in educa-
tion. Consequently, the efficiency of local education policies does not carry
over to a setup where all labor is mobile, as one might conjecture (this is
shown in section 3.5). Despite of the remaining joy of giving effect, educa-
tional subsidies vanish since, from the point of view of a local government,
the intergenerational externality is no longer relevant once the allocation of
all skill-types is subject to migration flows.
This indicates that mobility in the present setup does not provide a mecha-
nism to internalize intergenerational externalities as has been suggested by
Wellisch and Richter (1995) for the case of long-lived pollutants.26 The cru-
cial difference is that local emissions resemble local public goods that nega-
tively affect the utility of future generations. However, inducing emigration
26 While already discussed in Oates and Schwab (1988), the idea has later been formalized
by Wellisch and Richter (1995). Oates and Schwab (1996) derive a similar conclusion
using a median-voter model.
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tomorrow, pollution externalities capitalize into current land values. An en-
vironmental agency that takes changes in the value of land into account will
be forced to internalize the intergenerational externality. In contrast, inter-
generational externalities in the present setup are related to human capital
that is embodied in mobile, high-skilled households. Consequently, benefits
of previous efforts to internalize external effects to not necessarily accrue to
the home region, and the possibility to free-ride on other region’s education
policies arises. Still, as has been shown, local education policies remain to
be efficient.
This surprising result of efficient decentralized policy making is due to the
fact that regional investments in education determine the size of the future
immobile low-skilled workforce, irrespective of any assumption concerning
the mobility of the high-skilled. Thus, regional governments continue to re-
spect the human capital formation constraint as well as the associated impact
of education on future generations. Since parents do not take the intergen-
erational externality into account, local jurisdictions intend to correct this
market failure, irrespective of the fact that high-skilled workers are perfectly
mobile. Hence, perfect mobility of high-skilled labor does not destroy local
government’s incentives to correct educational underinvestment. Rather, in-
troducing social mobility forces local governments to adhere to the optimal
decision rule for education policies. Only the size and sign of τnet, which is
contingent on the level of consumption and education chosen by a regional
government, might deviate from the optimal subsidy a unitary state govern-
ment imposes. Thus, while regions stick to the optimal policy rule, it is not
clear whether the implemented subsidy replicates first-best optimum, as the
regional welfare optimum might entail different levels of consumption and
educational investments than the unitary state outcome.
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Notice that the efficiency of decentralized education policies is not depen-
dent on assumptions concerning the production technology or the migration
dynamics. While these assumptions affect the equilibrium obtained, this is
true for the unitary state as well as the decentralization case. For example,
if migration costs are introduced, the solution will no longer be symmetric
across countries as an interregional equalization of utility would violate the
migration equilibrium. This applies for the unitary state optimization as it
does at the local level. Yet, the efficiency of decentralized education policies
remains unaffected, as local jurisdictions abide by the optimal decision rule
for subsidizing education irrespective of the realized equilibrium. The same
reasoning holds true if one varies the social welfare function. One can easily
reveal that the optimal policy rule is unaffected if one uses fixed weights
rather than the size of the population groups. Even if jurisdictions adopt
a paretian welfare objective and only take into account the welfare of their
immobile, low-skilled residents, the educational policy rule remains the same.
While this might, again, entail different realized equilibria, the efficiency of
decentralized education policy persists.
Intraregional Redistribution
In the following, conditions replicating the welfare maximum of the uni-
tary state scenario are analyzed. To pursue this, assume that regions are
confronted with a federal decentralization policy that ensures that the mi-
gration constraint is not binding in the local optimum (ϕHt = 0). In this
case, optimal levels of consumption as well as educational investments in any
region i are type-independent with cnt = ct and e
n
t = et as can be revealed
from the first-order conditions on consumption and educational investments
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(equations (3.32) and (3.33)). Consequently, utility levels are equalized in
the optimum, and the local educational subsidy is identical for the different
types, τnet = τet. Note that this requires that any matching grant possibly
provided by the federal government is type-independent. In the remaining
analysis, the set of tax instruments available at the federal level will accord-
ingly be restricted to the use of region-specific matching grants that cannot
differentiate between types.
Following the above procedure, one can make use of the household’s budget
constraint to determine the optimal redistribution policy at the local level,
zHF ′(Zt)− τ
H
t − θ
H
t = ct + (1− τet)et = z
LF ′(Zt)− τ
L
t − θ
L
t (3.37)
⇔
(
zH − zL
)
F ′(Zt) =
(
τHt + θ
H
t
)
−
(
τLt + θ
L
t
)
> 0. (3.38)
Since productivity across types differs, but consumption as well as educa-
tional investments are equalized in the regional optimum, the aggregate head
tax on high-skilled households has to exceed the one on low-skilled. Given
the federal head taxes already chosen by the central government, a local
jurisdiction levies type-specific lump-sum taxes such that the productivity
difference between types is fully taxed away. As in the unitary state op-
timum, a benevolent regional government redistributes income from high-
to low-skilled workers to raise the utility of the low-skilled and maximize
utilitarian welfare.
Obviously, federal and local head taxes are perfect substitutes to establish
intraregional redistribution. As long as the central government levies type-
independent head taxes (θHt = θ
L
t ), local jurisdictions will appropriate the
whole income difference between the two types (τHt > τ
L
t ). Such a federal tax
policy leaves local redistribution unaffected. In order to focus on decentral-
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ization policies that are essential to replicate the first-best in the remainder
of this section, the set of available federal tax instruments is restricted to
type-independent taxes, that is both head taxes as well as the educational
grant can only be differentiated across regions, but not across types.
To evaluate under which conditions the local subsidy or tax on education
coincides with the educational subsidy that supports the first-best optimum
(equation (3.26)), one has to determine the value of the shadow price µLt
associated with the probability of being low-skilled. Again, use the first-order
conditions with respect to τnt as well as the fact that R
′(Zt) = −ZtF ′′(Zt) and
υnet
unct
= (1− τnet) to simplify the first-order conditions on high-skilled workers,
UHt (·) + λt
(
τHt − τ
H
et e
H
t
)
− µLt
[
1− h(eHt )
]
= 0, (3.39)
and on low-skilled workers,
0 = ULt (·) + λt
(
τLt − τ
L
ete
L
t
)
− µLt
[
1− h(eLt )
]
+ β−1µLt−1. (3.40)
Equating (3.39) and (3.40) yields the shadow price associated with the prob-
ability of being low-productive,
β−1µLt−1 = U
H
t (·)− U
L
t (·) + µ
L
t
[
h(eHt )− h(e
L
t )
]
+λt
[(
τHt − τ
H
et e
H
t
)
−
(
τLt − τ
L
ete
L
t
)]
. (3.41)
This shadow price consists of the difference between future high- and low-
skilled workers with respect to the utility levels, the tax payments they con-
tribute to the regional budget, and their children’s probability of becoming
high-skilled. As long as the social benefit of an additional high-skilled ex-
ceeds the benefit of a low-skilled worker, the shadow price is positive, and it
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is optimal to subsidize education. Evaluating in equilibrium and accounting
for local redistribution (equation (3.38)) further reduces equation (3.41) to
β−1µLt−1 = λt
(
τHt − τ
L
t
)
= λt
[(
zH − zL
)
F ′(Zt)−
(
θHt − θ
L
t
)]
. (3.42)
If the central government uses type-independent head taxes (θHt = θ
L
t ), the
net social benefit of migration reduces to the difference in productivities
between the two types,
β−1µLt−1 = λt
(
τHt − τ
L
t
)
= λt
(
zH − zL
)
F ′(Zt) > 0. (3.43)
The social benefit of turning a child into a high- instead of a low-skilled
worker is strictly positive, although high-skilled labor is perfectly mobile
across regions. This is due to the fact that high-skilled workers are assumed
to be more productive than low-skilled workers and contribute more to social
welfare in terms of higher tax payments. Put differently, the social benefit
of education is entirely determined by differences in productivity among the
two types, weighted by the marginal utility of consumption (λt). It follows
that the social benefit of eduction from the point of view of a local govern-
ment coincides with the social benefit of education as perceived by a federal
government (equation (3.25)): Private underinvestment in education involves
a welfare cost in terms of an increased number of less-productive low-skilled
workers that is correctly accounted for at the local level. This explains why,
even in the absence of any federal matching grant, a small region facing mo-
bility of high-skilled labor continues to subsidize education and intends to
correct private underinvestment,
τet =
µLt
λt
het > 0. (3.44)
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Yet, while a regional government will optimally subsidize education, it is
not clear whether the first-best optimum can be attained, since the regional
government uses the available fiscal policy instruments only to equate con-
sumption and investments in education across types, but not across regions.
This implies that the net social benefit of migration need not be equalized
between regions. Therefore, labor might be misallocated and production
efficiency violated.
Interregional Redistribution
In the first-best resulting from the unitary state optimization, consumption
and educational investments have to be equalized not only intraregionally,
but also across regions. This ensures that differences in the net social benefit
of migration across regions vanish, and labor is allocated efficiently. Yet,
a single jurisdiction only aims at redistributing income between types, not
between regions. To avoid the migration inefficiency, a central government,
therefore, has to ensure that decentralization results in an interregionally
symmetric equilibrium. Since intraregional redistribution can be delegated to
the regions, it suffices if the federal tax authority induces mobile high-skilled
households to choose the optimal consumption and educational spending
levels. This requires that the high-skilled are confronted with the optimal,
region-independent marginal rate of substitution and face the same net in-
come independent of their place of residence.
To derive the optimal decentralization policy, recall that the local government
already subsidizes education according to the optimal policy rule and, addi-
tionally, passes on the federal matching grant to the households (equation
(3.35)). This implies that the central government can complement the local
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educational policy by a region-specific educational matching grant θet,i such
that the subsidy paid at the local level equals the optimal, region-independent
first-best value,
τet,i =
µLt,i
λt,i
het,i + θet,i =
µLt
λt
het. (3.45)
This guarantees that all households in the federal economy are confronted
with the same shadow price of educational investments. Notice that irre-
spective of the fact that the federal level provides an educational matching
grant, local education policies remain to be efficient: While the local level
correctly accounts for the underinvestment problem, the matching grant is
used to avoid migration inefficiencies and establish the first-best. Still, even
in the absence of a higher-level tax authority, underinvestment in education
would be efficiently corrected by regional governments.
Additionally equating the net income of mobile households across regions,
the central government can decentralize the first-best optimum and establish
the interregionally symmetric equilibrium,
zHF ′(Zt,i)−
(
τHt,i + θ
H
t,i
)
= cHt + (1− τet)e
H
t
= zHF ′(Zt,j)−
(
τHt,j + θ
H
t,j
)
. (3.46)
Notice that identical local spending levels have an important implication for
the allocation of workers across regions. Since the Lagrange-multipliers λt,i
and µLt,i will now be identical in all regions, one can equate the social benefit
of education as defined in equation (3.43),
λt
(
zH − zL
)
F ′(Zt,i) = β
−1µLt−1 = λt
(
zH − zL
)
F ′(Zt,j) (3.47)
⇔ F ′(Zt,i) = F
′(Zt,j). (3.48)
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From equation (3.48) one can infer that production efficiency holds in the
decentralized equilibrium, as the aggregate effective labor supply Zt,i will be
equalized. Applying this result to equation (3.46) immediately reveals the
optimal federal redistribution policy,
(
τHt,i + θ
H
t,i
)
=
(
τHt,j + θ
H
t,j
)
. (3.49)
Consequently, the central government can decentralize the first-best by im-
posing federal head taxes such that the aggregate lump-sum tax on high-
skilled labor is identical for all regions
Proposition 11 The central government can decentralize the first-best pro-
viding a region-specific educational matching grant and imposing identical
aggregate head taxes in all regions. This establishes an interregionally sym-
metric equilibrium and induces local governments to redistribute income from
mobile high- to immobile low-skilled labor to achieve a symmetric intrare-
gional equilibrium.
Since local governments adhere to the optimal decision rule for education
policies and use lump-sum taxes to achieve a symmetric intraregional equi-
librium, the central government can replicate the first-best by equating the
net income of high-skilled households across regions using region-independent
federal head taxes.27 This guarantees that consumption and educational ex-
penditures are equalized across regions. As a consequence the migration
constraint is not binding, which was the prerequisite for efficient regional
redistribution policies. Furthermore, such a federal policy of interregional
27 To ensure that intra-regional redistribution is not violated, federal head taxes have to
be type-independent.
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redistribution ensures that the aggregate effective labor supply is equalized
across regions (Zt,i = Zt,j), and production efficiency is established.
3.5 Optimal Education Policies with High-
and Low-Skilled Migration
The preceding analysis reveals that local jurisdictions abide by the optimal
decision rule for subsidizing education even in the presence of perfect mobil-
ity of high-skilled labor. However, the result hinges on the assumption that
low-skilled households are immobile. As the size of a region’s low-skilled
workforce is determined by local investments in education, regional govern-
ments respect the human capital formation constraint and efficiently correct
private underinvestment in education. In the following, this assumption is
relaxed and mobility of both the high- and the low-skilled population is con-
sidered. Again, the unitary state optimum is derived as a benchmark case,
followed by a discussion of decentralized policies of local jurisdictions.
3.5.1 Unitary State Optimum
Introducing mobility of high- and low-skilled households imposes an ad-
ditional constraint on the optimization problem of the unitary state gov-
ernment, namely the migration equilibrium for the low-skilled type. This
equilibrium condition states, analogously to high-skilled migration, that in
any migration equilibrium the utility levels of low-skilled workers have to
be equalized across regions. In case of high- and low-skilled mobility, the
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unitary state government solves
max
∞∑
t=0
βt
{ ∑
i
∑
n
Nnt,i
[
u
(
cnt,i
)
+ υ(ent,i)
]
+
∑
i
∑
n
κnt,i
[
znF ′(Zt,i)− τ
n
t,i − θ
n
t,i − c
n
t,i −
υnet,i
unct,i
ent,i
]
+ λt
∑
i
∑
n
Nnt,i
(
θnt,i − θ
n
et,ie
n
t,i
)
+
∑
i
λt,i
[∑
n
Nnt,i(τ
n
t,i +
υnet,i
unct,i
ent,i −
(
1− θnet,i
)
ent,i) +R(Zt,i)
]
(3.50)
+ µLt
∑
i
[
NLt+1,i −
∑
n
Nnt,i
[
1− h(ent,i)
]]
+ µt
[
N¯t −
∑
i
∑
n
Nnt,i
]
+
∑
i6=j
∑
n
ϕnt,i
[
u(cnt,j) + υ(e
n
t,j)− u
(
cnt,i
)
− υ(ent,i)
] }
,
with the Lagrange-multipliers denoted by κnt,i, λt, λt,i, µ
L
t , µt and ϕ
n
t,i.
Note that in the case of low-skilled mobility, the allocation of both types of
workers across regions is entirely determined by migration flows. Thus, the
low-skilled workforce available in any region i is no longer contingent on pre-
vious local educational investments. Only the aggregate federal endowment
with low-skilled tomorrow depends on parental investments in education to-
day. In contrast to the case of high-skilled mobility, the Lagrange-multiplier
on the human capital formation constraint (µLt ) is, therefore, independent
of the respective region i. The first-order conditions to the optimization
problem are stated in Appendix B.2.1.
Following the above procedure, one can reveal that the unitary state govern-
ment chooses the same decision rule for subsidizing education, irrespective
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of whether one or all types of labor are mobile across regions. Furthermore,
the first-best optimum in the presence of high- and low-skilled migration co-
incides with the solution derived above for the case of high-skilled mobility.
This is plausible, since the migration equilibrium constraints are not bind-
ing in the optimum. Hence, introducing mobility of high- and low-skilled
labor does neither change the welfare maximum nor the optimal educational
subsidy chosen by a unitary state government.
Yet, regional governments might refrain from subsidizing education in the
presence of high- and low-skilled mobility, since the number of both types of
workers allocated in the respective region is independent of regional invest-
ments in education. This is due to the fact that local jurisdictions perceive
the supply of mobile households as infinitely elastic. In the following section,
optimal local fiscal policies are studied and the need for federal education
policies is discussed, given that high- as well as low-skilled workers can mi-
grate across regions.
3.5.2 Decentralization of the Unitary State Optimum
Perfect mobility of both types of workers changes the optimization constraints
local governments face substantially. Since from the point of view of a small
open region the mobile factor is in perfectly elastic supply, a regional govern-
ment perceives the size of the respective type of worker as only dependent on
migration incentives. Thus, it disregards the fact that the evolution of the
different population groups is contingent on regional investments in educa-
tion and no longer respects the human capital formation constraint. Hence,
a local government chooses the regional tax rate {τnt } and the allocations
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{cnt , e
n
t , N
n
t } to solve the following problem,
max
∞∑
t=0
βt
{ ∑
n
Nnt [u(c
n
t ) + υ(e
n
t )]
+
∑
n
κnt
[
znF ′(Zt)− τ
n
t − θ
n
t − c
n
t −
υnet
unct
ent
]
+λt
[∑
n
Nnt (τ
n
t +
υnet
unct
ent − (1− θ
n
et) e
n
t ) +R(Zt)
]
(3.51)
+
∑
n
ϕnt [u(c
n
t ) + υ(e
n
t )− u(c
n
t ) + υ(e
n
t )]
}
,
where κnt , λt and ϕ
n
t denote the Lagrange-multipliers. The utility level at-
tainable for mobile workers outside region i is given by u(cnt ) + υ(e
n
t ). The
first-order conditions are presented in Appendix B.2.2.
Optimal Policy Rule
Again, one can simplify the first-order conditions with respect to consump-
tion and investments using the first-order conditions on τnt , c
n
t and e
n
t ,
(Nnt − ϕ
n
t )
Nnt
unct = λt and
(Nnt − ϕ
n
t )
Nnt
υnet = λt (1− θ
n
et) . (3.52)
From equation (3.52), region i’s marginal rate of substitution between con-
sumption and educational investments can be derived,
υne
unc
= (1− θnet) . (3.53)
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Equating the regionally optimal and the private marginal rate of substitution
immediately reveals the educational subsidy chosen by a local government,
(1− θnet) =
υne
unc
= (1− τnet) ⇔ τ
n
et = θ
n
et. (3.54)
The optimal regional policy in the presence of high- and low-skilled mobility
is not to subsidize education at all. Since the federal matching grant is
conditional on local investments in education, local governments have to pass
θnet on to households, but refrain from subsidizing education themselves:
28 In
the absence of any federal grant (θnet = 0), a local jurisdiction does not
subsidize education (τnet = 0).
The inefficiency of local education policies can be explained by the fact that
from the point of view of a small open region, the available size of both the
high- and the low-skilled workforce is entirely determined by migration flows.
Previous investments in education have no impact on the composition of the
local workforce. Hence, educational underinvestment is not accounted for at
the regional level. This entails an inefficient evolution of the composition of
the federal population as private underinvestment persists.
Since local governments disregard this inefficiency, the central government
has to correct the intergenerational externality. According to equation (3.19),
the central government intends to set τet =
µLt
λt
het to establish the first-best
optimum. The local decision rule (equation (3.54)) then requires a federal
matching grant of θet =
µLt
λt
het. Since the regional government has to pass the
optimal federal grant on to it’s residents, it is forced to implement the optimal
educational subsidy. Therefore, the federal matching grant is an efficient
28 Again, this finding is robust, irrespective of whether the grant is paid to regional
governments or directly to households.
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policy tool to decentralize the first-best optimum. Still, since the federal
grant replaces local education policies, the first-best optimum can effectively
only be established by assigning competencies in the field of education policy
to the federal level.
Proposition 12 If high- and low-skilled workers are mobile across regions,
decentralized education policies are inefficient as incentives of local jurisdic-
tions to subsidize education vanish completely. To correct educational under-
investment, education policies have to be assigned effectively to the federal or
supranational level.
Similarly to the case of high-skilled mobility only, the result concerning the
inefficiency of decentralized education policies carries over to a scenario in
which migration costs are present. Only if mobile households face a certain
probability to emigrate, part of the workforce remains immobile and is, thus,
affected by local education policies with a positive probability. Consequently,
local governments continue to respect the human capital formation constraint
and choose an efficient education policy.
Intraregional Redistribution
In the following, the optimal local redistribution policy that supports the
first-best optimum is deduced. To this end, it is again assumed that regions
face a federal policy ensuring that the migration constraint is not binding
in the local optimum (ϕHt = 0). According to the first-order conditions on
consumption and educational investments (equation (3.52)), this entails that
optimal levels of expenditure in any region i are identical, irrespective of the
type of household, cnt = ct and e
n
et = et. Recall that intraregional symmetry
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in consumption and education guarantees that utility levels between types
are identical in the optimum, and utilitarian welfare is maximized.
Since the optimal federal grant is type-independent, one can equate the
household’s budget constraints and derive the optimal redistribution policy
between low- and high-skilled workers,
zHF ′(Zt)− τ
H
t − θ
L
t = ct + (1− θet)et = z
LF ′(Zt)− τ
L
t − θ
L
t (3.55)
⇔
(
zH − zL
)
F ′(Zt) =
(
τHt + θ
H
t
)
−
(
τLt + θ
L
t
)
> 0. (3.56)
Intraregional equalization of consumption and educational investments re-
quires that the net income of the different types is equalized. Consequently,
the aggregate head taxes on the high-skilled have to exceed the taxes on the
low-skilled type.
The head taxes chosen by the local government will, however, be type-
independent. To see this, use the first-order condition with respect to τnt
and the fact that R′(Zt) = −ZtF ′′(Zt) and equate the first-order condition
with respect to the population groups,
UHt (·) + λtτ
H
t = 0 = U
L
t (·) + λtτ
L
t (3.57)
⇔ τHt = τ
L
t = τt. (3.58)
The left- and right-hand side of equation (3.57) can be interpreted as the net
social benefit of an additional high- and low-skilled worker from the point of
view of a small open region: In the case of high- and low-skilled mobility,
immigration no longer involves any educational benefits, but only contribu-
tions in terms of additional utility and tax payments of the respective type
of migrant. If the central government ensures that the migration constraint
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is not binding, consumption and education are identical for both types. This
implies identical utility levels and explains why local governments have no
interest in redistributing income between the different types: High- and low-
skilled workers are perfectly homogenous from the point of view of a local,
welfare maximizing government. Since the gain in utility from immigration
of a high- or low-skilled worker is the same, the local government does not
intend to alter migration incentives for different types. Rather, the optimal
policy at the local level is to distribute profits evenly among the two types,
τnt = τt.
29
Given type-independent local head taxes, the central government has to
achieve the symmetric intraregional equilibrium. One can use the local dis-
tribution policy to rewrite equation (3.56) and deduce the optimal federal
head taxes, (
zH − zL
)
F ′(Zt) = θ
H
t − θ
L
t > 0. (3.59)
The central government levies type-specific federal head taxes to ensure that
expenditure levels are equalized across types. This guarantees that a sym-
metric intraregional equilibrium is attained. However, it is not clear whether
this replicates the first-best optimum that additionally entails interregional
redistribution.
Interregional Redistribution
In the first-best equilibrium resulting from the unitary state optimization,
consumption and educational investments are equalized interregionally, im-
plying that the net social benefit of migration is identical across regions. Yet,
29 In the absence of a local educational subsidy, the only purpose of local fiscal policy is
to distribute profits. Therefore, local lump-sum taxes are negative.
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regional governments do not take into account any migration inefficiencies
resulting from local tax policies. Consequently, they do not aim to establish
an interregionally symmetric equilibrium. However, the first-best optimum
can easily be established by the federal government that already imposes the
optimal matching grant, entailing that the marginal rate of substitution be-
tween consumption and educational investments is independent of the place
of residence. This implies that the unitary state level of consumption and
educational investments can easily be established by equating the net income
of households across regions,30
zHF ′(Zt,i)− τ
H
t,i − θ
H
t,i = c
H
t − (1− θet)e
H
t = z
HF ′(Zt,j)− τ
H
t,j − θ
H
t,j . (3.60)
Equation (3.60) reveals that a symmetric interregional equilibrium can be
attained if the central government imposes federal head taxes that equate
the net income of high-skilled households across regions.
Yet, it remains to be proven that production efficiency holds in the optimum:
According to the first-order condition on consumption (equation (3.52)) and
the optimal grant provided (equation (3.19)), the symmetric equilibrium en-
tails that the Lagrange-multipliers λt,i and µ
L
t,i are identical across regions.
This indicates that the social benefit of education as accounted for by an
intervening central government aiming to establish the first-best (equation
(3.25)) is the same in all regions,
λt,i
(
zH − zL
)
F ′(Zt,i) = β
−1µLt−1 = λt,j
(
zH − zL
)
F ′(Zt,j) (3.61)
⇔ F ′(Zt,i) = F
′(Zt,j). (3.62)
30 Given the symmetric intraregional equilibrium, it is sufficient to establish identical
consumption levels of the high-skilled type between regions.
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The analysis reveals that federal policies can replicate the first-best opti-
mum in which production efficiency holds. This, however, requires the cen-
tral government to provide the optimal educational grant and - given type-
independent local lump-sum taxation - impose a type-specific head tax to
redistribute income. Furthermore, federal lump-sum taxation has to be used
in a way to ensure that the aggregate head tax on mobile high-skilled labor is
identical across regions. To see this, apply the result of production efficiency
to equation (3.60),
τHt,i + θ
H
t,i = τ
H
t,j + θ
H
t,j . (3.63)
Such interregional redistribution ensures the efficient allocation of labor ac-
cording to equation (3.30), as migration flows are driven by productivity
differences alone. Consequently, production efficiency will be established in
the optimum.
Proposition 13 If both high- and low-skilled workers are perfectly mobile,
local jurisdictions distribute profits evenly among their residents. This im-
plies that competencies for both education policy as well as redistribution have
to be assigned to the federal level.
Instead of supporting education by subsidizing private educational invest-
ments, local governments refrain from using corrective tax instruments in
the presence of high- and low-skilled mobility. A small region ignores the
educational inefficiency as it regards the available amount of high- and low-
skilled workers as infinite (perfect elasticity of supply). Hence, private un-
derinvestment in education persists unless it is accounted for at the federal
or supranational level. To correct the underinvestment problem, the central
government can use a federal matching grant. However, such a grant will
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only be passed on by the local government and, thus, constitutes a perfect
substitute for subsidies on education paid directly to households. Therefore,
decentralization in a setting with high- and low-skilled mobility requires the
fiscal authority on the field of education policy to be assigned effectively to
the federal or supranational level. Furthermore, federal head taxes have to be
imposed to establish both the intra- as well as the interregionally symmetric
equilibrium.
3.6 Conclusion
In the view of increased mobility of high-skilled labor, local governments
face the option to free-ride on other regions’ education policies instead of
correcting educational underinvestment themselves. Still, one can observe
that education is financed substantially by local governments. The present
research provides an explanation for this phenomenon that is based on the
effect of social mobility across different skill-types. The notion social mobility
reflects the fact that parental investments in education today determine their
children’s probability to become high-skilled tomorrow. The model thereby
extends previous studies to a dynamic setup, endogenizing the evolution of
the size of the different skill-types over time. Moreover, an intergenerational
externality is introduced that leads to a situation of underinvestment in edu-
cation and, hence, provides a justification for a corrective educational subsidy
from a federal perspective. Against this background, the efficiency of decen-
tralized decision making in the presence of perfect, high-skilled mobility is
discussed.
It is shown that small regions abide by the optimal decision rule for subsi-
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dizing education, although high-skilled workers are perfectly mobile across
regions. This is surprising, since private underinvestment in human capital
can, from the point of view of a small region, be fully compensated by high-
skilled immigration from neighboring jurisdictions. However, in a dynamic
setup with social mobility underinvestment in education not only affects the
size of the high-skilled workforce, but additionally determines the number of
immobile low-skilled workers in the respective region. Consequently, the in-
centive to correct educational underinvestment prevails although high-skilled
labor is assumed to be perfectly mobile. Thus, decentralized education poli-
cies remain to be efficient. Social mobility, therefore, provides an explanation
of why local governments continue to subsidize education, even though high-
skilled workers can migrate.
However, the efficiency of decentralized education policies does not persist
in a scenario in which both types of labor are mobile. In such a setup, local
governments lose any incentive to subsidize education since both the size of
the high- and low-skilled workforce are solely determined by migration flows.
From the point of view of a small region, previous local investments in edu-
cation are entirely irrelevant for the composition of today’s workforce. This
explains why decentralized education policies turn out to be inefficient. To
prevent underinvestment in this case, education policies have to be assigned
to the federal or supranational level.
Though two polar cases - perfect high-skilled mobility and perfect high- as
well as low-skilled mobility - are considered in the present analysis, the re-
sults carry over to more realistic migration scenarios including costs of mov-
ing. Moreover, one can conjecture that at least for some workers barriers
to migration are prohibitively high. Hence, part of the low-skilled will most
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likely be immobile. As long as only a fraction of the low-skilled workforce
continues to be immobile, the findings derived in the present chapter indicate
that decentralized education policies remain to be efficient.
The results, therefore, imply that local governments facing mobility of labor
do not necessarily lose their scope to correct market failures, at least not
with respect to underinvestment in education. While this finding seems to
be surprising given the standard reasoning of the literature on local public
finance, it underlines the importance of extending fiscal federalism models to
dynamic frameworks capable of analyzing the impact of factor flows on both
the interregional allocation of the mobile factor as well as it’s evolution over
time.
Chapter 4
Concluding Remarks
Previous research on local public finance often resorts to static modeling ap-
proaches. Yet, incorporating the evolution of mobile factors over time adds
an additional dimension of mobility that directly affects optimal fiscal poli-
cies. The present thesis contributes to a relatively new strand of literature
focusing on these dynamic aspects of local public finance. To explore the
time dimension of factor mobility, two distinct frameworks are set up, inte-
grating a migration decision of households while additionally modeling the
accumulation of mobile factors over time.
The first model developed analyzes the implications of perfect mobility of
labor for the optimal taxation of capital income. To pursue this, standard
models of optimal taxation in dynamic general equilibrium frameworks are
extended to include both mobile capital as well as mobile labor. Moreover,
to study the relevance of congestion costs arising as a consequence of immi-
gration, it is assumed that the government provides a rival, local public good
that directly enters the production process. The analysis proceeds in two
steps: The first part abstracts from the possibility of migration to demon-
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strate that the basic model replicates the standard findings of the literature:
the optimal long-run tax on capital income vanishes, while a tax on labor in-
come is efficient to internalize the congestion costs. Moreover, the residence
principle of taxation is welfare maximizing.
The second part derives the optimal fiscal policy allowing for perfect mobility
of households in addition to mobile capital. The theoretical analysis indicates
that integrating labor mobility into dynamic models of taxation influences
optimal fiscal policies. More precisely, migration turns out to be particularly
important for the structure of capital income taxation as it affects the choice
of the optimal international tax regime: While the residence principle of
taxation is optimal in the absence of migration, the source principle is welfare
maximizing once mobility of labor is introduced. This is due to the fact that
migration responds to differences in consumption growth. Since the source
principle ensures a convergence of consumption growth rates across countries,
it avoids tax-induced migration flows and establishes an efficient international
allocation of mobile factors.
The second framework that is developed in the present thesis emphasizes
the impact of labor mobility on local education policies: in view of a po-
tential brain drain, public incentives to promote education might give way
to attempts to attract mobile workers using favorable tax systems, i.e. to
free-ride on other countries’ education policies. Fiscal competition for mo-
bile labor might, hence, reduce the incentives of local governments to correct
market failures and, consequently, lower social welfare. This free-rider prob-
lem at the level of local jurisdictions is studied, introducing social mobility
between skill-types as a dynamic dimension of labor mobility.
Deriving the optimal education policy reveals that local governments stick to
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the optimal decision rule for subsidizing education even though high-skilled
labor is perfectly mobile. This is due to the fact that social mobility across
skill-types has been introduced: Private underinvestment in education affects
the long-term composition of the domestic population as it not only deter-
mines the size of the high-skilled workforce, but additionally the number of
immobile low-skilled workers. As a consequence, small countries are forced to
take the underinvestment problem into account and continue to support ed-
ucation publicly, although high-skilled workers are perfectly mobile. Again,
the analysis indicates that integrating the evolution of mobile factors over
time impacts the results of standard models substantially.
To summarize, the findings of this thesis demonstrate that recognizing the
dynamic dimension of factor movements matters. However, although the
present work presented two examples that indicate the benefits involved from
modeling factor mobility in space and time jointly, more research in this
direction is needed to fully realize the gains of moving towards a dynamic
perspective of local public finance. The next steps in this direction should aim
at relaxing unrealistic modeling assumptions, such as the perfect mobility of
production factors, to be able to derive more general results and put policy
recommendations on more solid grounds. The most fundamental limitation of
the present work is probably the presumption that national states or federal
jurisdictions that compete for mobile factors do not interact strategically.
Yet, while incorporating strategic interaction in static models is a common
standard in the literature on fiscal competition, applying these methods to
a dynamic setting is a challenging task.
Secondly, the assumption of benevolent, welfare maximizing governments is
undoubtedly unrealistic and rather represents a theoretical concept useful in
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normative analyses. However, the opposing view of selfish, rent-extracting
Leviathan governments might be equally restrictive. Future studies on dy-
namic aspects of local public finance should follow the work of Edwards and
Keen (1996) and try to assess these opposing views of government behavior
in an integrated approach. Although worthwhile exploring, such considera-
tions are clearly beyond the scope of the present thesis and have to be left
for future research.
A Appendix to Chapter 2
A.1 Optimality Conditions in the Absence of
Migration
The central planning problem leads to the following first-order conditions,
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µ denotes the Lagrange multiplier on the resource constraint. Note that the
above derivation with respect to consumption only applies to t ≥ 1. For
period 0 optimization yields
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A.2 Optimality Conditions in the Presence of
Migration
The first-order conditions for the central planning problem in the presence
of migration are as follows,
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µ denotes the Lagrange multiplier on the resource constraint. Again, the
first-order condition on consumption in period 0 is given by
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B Appendix to Chapter 3
B.1 Migration of High-Skilled Workers
B.1.1 Unitary State Optimization
The first-order conditions for the central planning problem are as follows,
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To gain symmetric first-order conditions, define the multiplier on the migra-
tion constraint for the arbitrarily chosen reference region j as ϕHt,j = −ϕ
H
t,i.
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B.1.2 Regional Optimization
The first-order conditions for the local optimization problem are
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B.2 Migration of High- as well as Low-Skilled
Workers
B.2.1 Unitary State Optimization
Optimization of the unitary state government in case of high- and low-skilled
mobility yields the following first-order conditions,
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B.2.2 Regional Optimization
The first-order conditions of the regional optimization, when high- and low-
skilled workers are mobile, are
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